Introducing the 2026 Cloudflare Threat Report

Today’s threat landscape is more varied and chilling than ever: Sophisticated nation-state actors. Hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks. Deepfakes and fraudsters interviewing at your company. Even stealth attacks via trusted internal tools like Google Calendar, Dropbox, and GitHub.

After spending the last year translating trillions of network signals into actionable intelligence, Cloudforce One has identified a fundamental evolution in the threat landscape: the era of brute force entry is fading. In its place is a model of high-trust exploitation that prioritizes results at all costs. In order to equip defenders with a strategic roadmap for this new era, today we are releasing the inaugural 2026 Cloudflare Threat Report. This report provides the intelligence organizations need to navigate the rise of industrialized cyber threats.

Cloudforce One has observed a broader shift in attacker psychology. To understand how these methods win, we have to look at the why behind them: the Measure of Effectiveness, or MOE.

In 2026, the modern adversary is trading the pursuit of "sophistication" (complex, expensive, one-off hacks) in favor of throughput. MOE is the metric attackers use to decide what to exploit next. It is a cold calculation of the Continue reading

React2Shell and related RSC vulnerabilities threat brief: early exploitation activity and threat actor techniques

On December 3, 2025, immediately following the public disclosure of the critical, maximum-severity React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182), the Cloudforce One Threat Intelligence team began monitoring for early signs of exploitation. Within hours, we observed scanning and active exploitation attempts, including traffic originating from infrastructure associated with Asian-nexus threat groups.

Early activity indicates that threat actors quickly integrated this vulnerability into their scanning and reconnaissance routines. We observed systematic probing of exposed systems, testing for the flaw at scale, and incorporating it into broader sweeps of Internet‑facing assets. The identified behavior reveals the actors relied on a combination of tools, such as standard vulnerability scanners and publicly accessible Internet asset discovery platforms, to find potentially vulnerable React Server Components (RSC) deployments exposed to the Internet.

Patterns in observed threat activity also suggest that the actors focused on identifying specific application metadata — such as icon hashes, SSL certificate details, or geographic region identifiers — to refine their candidate target lists before attempting exploitation. 

In addition to React2Shell, two additional vulnerabilities affecting specific RSC implementations were disclosed: CVE-2025-55183 and CVE-2025-55184. Both vulnerabilities, while distinct from React2Shell, also relate to RSC payload handling and Server Function semantics, and are described in more detail Continue reading

Disrupting FlyingYeti’s campaign targeting Ukraine

Cloudforce One is publishing the results of our investigation and real-time effort to detect, deny, degrade, disrupt, and delay threat activity by the Russia-aligned threat actor FlyingYeti during their latest phishing campaign targeting Ukraine. At the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine introduced a moratorium on evictions and termination of utility services for unpaid debt. The moratorium ended in January 2024, resulting in significant debt liability and increased financial stress for Ukrainian citizens. The FlyingYeti campaign capitalized on anxiety over the potential loss of access to housing and utilities by enticing targets to open malicious files via debt-themed lures. If opened, the files would result in infection with the PowerShell malware known as COOKBOX, allowing FlyingYeti to support follow-on objectives, such as installation of additional payloads and control over the victim’s system.

Since April 26, 2024, Cloudforce One has taken measures to prevent FlyingYeti from launching their phishing campaign – a campaign involving the use of Cloudflare Workers and GitHub, as well as exploitation of the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831. Our countermeasures included internal actions, such as detections and code takedowns, as well as external collaboration with third parties to remove the actor’s cloud-hosted malware. Continue reading