These days its up to IPv6 Service providers to determine what IPv6 address prefix length they assign to each customer. This leads to the question: What lengths are commonly used for customer assignments? Let's see if we can answer it.
It's a welcome sight to see a careful and thoughtful analysis of a service outage. One such instance was a presentation by .nz's Josh Simpson at the recent NZNOG meeting, reporting on a service outage for .nz domains.
The Internet is rapidly shifting to a name-based network and the DNS is now the underlying technology that lies the core of today's network. So, let’s see what we are currently thinking about in terms of names and the DNS at the recent IETF meeting.
I had the opportunity to participate in the New Zealand Network Operators Group meeting (NZNOG) in Nelson earlier this month. This article was prompted by a presentation from Thomas Weible of Flexoptix at NZNOG on the topic of Coherent Optical Transceivers.
We repeat the measurements of the behaviour of the DNS when processing truncated UDP responses, but this time we've constrained the measurement so that only IPv6-capable DNS resolvers are being measured. Does this make the results better or worse?
We repeat the measurements of the behaviour of the DNS when processing truncated UDP responses, but this time we've constrained the measurement so that only IPv6-capable DNS resolvers are being measured. Does this make the results better or worse?
Yet another DNS vulnerability has been exposed. The language of the press release revealing the vulnerabil;ity is certainly dramatic, with "devasting consequences" and the threat to "completely disable large parts of the worldwide Internet."" If this is really so devastating then perhaps we should look at this in a little more detail to see what’s going on, how this vulnerability works, and what the response has been.
Yet another DNS vulnerability has been exposed. The language of the press release revealing the vulnerabil;ity is certainly dramatic, with "devasting consequences" and the threat to "completely disable large parts of the worldwide Internet."" If this is really so devastating then perhaps we should look at this in a little more detail to see what’s going on, how this vulnerability works, and what the response has been.
There is a view that Internet standards, and the IETF in particular, are at the centre of many corporate and national strategies to exert broad influence and shape the internet to match their own preferred image. This view asserts that standards have become the most important component of the Internet’s infrastructure. Due to their economic and strategic importance, the process of creation of internet standards are inevitably subject to the intense economic and political tensions between diverse world views. There are, naturally, other views, along the lines that the IETF does little other than reflect the more general pressures and directions being taken by industry actors, and has no ability to exert any leadership role in this space.
There is a view that Internet standards, and the IETF in particular, are at the centre of many corporate and national strategies to exert broad influence and shape the internet to match their own preferred image. This view asserts that standards have become the most important component of the Internet’s infrastructure. Due to their economic and strategic importance, the process of creation of internet standards are inevitably subject to the intense economic and political tensions between diverse world views. There are, naturally, other views, along the lines that the IETF does little other than reflect the more general pressures and directions being taken by industry actors, and has no ability to exert any leadership role in this space.
I’ll press on with another item within an overall theme of some current work in DNS behaviours with a report of a recent measurement on the level of compliance of DNS resolvers with one aspect of standard-defined DNS behaviour: truncation of DNS over UDP responses.
I’ll press on with another item within an overall theme of some current work in DNS behaviours with a report of a recent measurement on the level of compliance of DNS resolvers with one aspect of standard-defined DNS behaviour: truncation of DNS over UDP responses.
The DNS Operations, Analysis, and Research Center (DNS-OARC) brings together DNS service operators, DNS software implementors, and researchers together to share concerns, information and learn together about the operation and evolution of the DNS. They meet between two to three times a year in a workshops format. The most recent workshop was held in Charlotte, North Carolina in early February 2024. Here are my thoughts on the material that was presented and discussed at this workshop.
The DNS Operations, Analysis, and Research Center (DNS-OARC) brings together DNS service operators, DNS software implementors, and researchers together to share concerns, information and learn together about the operation and evolution of the DNS. They meet between two to three times a year in a workshops format. The most recent workshop was held in Charlotte, North Carolina in early February 2024. Here are my thoughts on the material that was presented and discussed at this workshop.
The DNS is a large-scale distributed database, where the internal structure of the databaase mirrors the hierarchical nature of the name space itself. In the database the points of delegation from one node to another are de noted by DNS Nameserver records. This structure has served the DNS adequately for many decades, so why change it?
The DNS is a large-scale distributed database, where the internal structure of the databaase mirrors the hierarchical nature of the name space itself. In the database the points of delegation from one node to another are de noted by DNS Nameserver records. This structure has served the DNS adequately for many decades, so why change it?
Time for another annual roundup from the world of IP addresses. Let’s see what has changed in the past 12 months in addressing the Internet and look at how IP address allocation information can inform us of the changing nature of the network itself.
Time for another annual roundup from the world of IP addresses. Let’s see what has changed in the past 12 months in addressing the Internet and look at how IP address allocation information can inform us of the changing nature of the network itself.
the scalability of BGP as the Internet’s routing protocol is not just dependant on the number of prefixes carried in the routing table. BGP protocol behaviour in the form of dynamic routing updates are also part of this story. If the update rate of BGP is growing faster than we can deploy processing capability to match, then the routing system will lose coherence, and at that point the network will head into periods of instability. This report looks at the profile of BGP updates across 2023 to assess whether the stability of the routing system, as measured by the level of BGP update activity, is changing.
the scalability of BGP as the Internet’s routing protocol is not just dependant on the number of prefixes carried in the routing table. BGP protocol behaviour in the form of dynamic routing updates are also part of this story. If the update rate of BGP is growing faster than we can deploy processing capability to match, then the routing system will lose coherence, and at that point the network will head into periods of instability. This report looks at the profile of BGP updates across 2023 to assess whether the stability of the routing system, as measured by the level of BGP update activity, is changing.
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