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Hedge 133: Brooks Westfield and Multifactor Testing

Multi-factor testing is one of the most important jobs a vendor takes on—and one of the most underrated. Testing across all possible configurations and use cases is nearly impossible. Brooks Westbrook joins Tom Ammon and Russ White on this episode of the Hedge to talk about the complexity of multi-factor testing and some of the consequences of that complexity.

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Revisiting BGP Convergence

My video on BGP convergence elicited a lot of . . . feedback, mainly concerning the difference between convergence in a data center fabric and convergence in the DFZ. Let’s begin here—BGP hunt and the impact of the MRAI are very real in the DFZ. Withdrawing a route can take several minutes.

What about the much more controlled environment of a data center fabric?

Several folks pointed out that the MRAI is often set to 0 in DC fabrics (and many implementations by default). Further, almost all implementations will use an MRAI of 0 for the first received update, holding the second and subsequent advertisements by the MRAI. Several folks also pointed out that all the paths through a DC fabric are the same length, so the second part of the equation is also very small.

These are good points—how do they impact BGP convergence? Let’s use the network below, a small slice of a five-stage butterfly fabric, to think it through. Assume every router is in a different AS, so all the peering sessions are eBGP.

Start with A losing its connection to 101::/64—

  • T1: A withdraws its route from B and C
  • T2: B withdraws its route from D and E, Continue reading

Weekend Reads 060322

This edition of weekend reads begins with a few straight security stories of interest. I knew key loggers existed in the wild, but the logging of keystrokes before a web form is submitted is apparently a lot more common than I realized—


They found that 1,844 websites gathered an EU user’s email address without their consent, and a staggering 2,950 logged a US user’s email in some form. Many of the sites seemingly do not intend to conduct the data-logging but incorporate third-party marketing and analytics services that cause the behavior.

Illustrating that security is often a game of “whack-a-mole,” web skimmers are obfuscating their operation—


Microsoft security researchers recently observed that web skimming campaigns now employ various obfuscation techniques to deliver and hide skimming scripts.

Identity is fraught with problems even in the real world; just as people used to carry “letters of introduction” with them when they moved to a new area or started a new job, identity is often a matter of transitive trust. How to replicate transitive trust in the digital world is still a problem, but it’s also the foundation of decentralized systems—


The central thesis of the decentralized future is that I should be
Continue reading

Hedge 132: DNS Complexity and the DNAME

We all intuitively know the DNS is complex—and becoming more complex over time. Describing just how complex, however, is difficult. Siva Kesava and Ryan Beckett just published a research paper taking on the task of describing DNS complexity, particularly in light of the new DNAME record type. It turns out its complex enough that you can no longer really validate zone files.

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Weekend Reads 052722

networks and policy

Leading off this weekend, an article by Simon Sharwood on the impact of the centralization of the Internet. I wrote a somewhat longer article on the Public Discourse a while back on the same topic.


The internet has become smaller, the result of a rethinking of when and where to use the ‘net’s intended architecture. In the process it may also have further concentrated power in the hands of giant technology companies.

Is softwarization really going to change the way we build networks from the ground up? I suspect things will change, but they’ve always changed. I also suspect we’ll be hearing about how software is going to eat the world ten years from now, and IPv6 still won’t be fully deployed.


DOCSIS 4.0 is set to deliver faster speeds for cable network operators, but the next generation technology will also spur an operational sea change, telecom consultant Sean McDevitt told Fierce.


By default, the Docker server configures container networks for IPv4-only, so I had a hard time running it in this environment.

security and other technologies

This one on Costa Rica is a serious warning—


A ransomware gang that infiltrated some Costa Rican government computer
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Hedge 131: Easier for the Computer or the Person?

One of the mainstays of scripting—and now network management—are increasingly focused on making things “easier” for the human operator. Does this focus on making things “easier” for the operator produce a better experience, though? Or does it create frustration as humans try to “outguess” the computer’s programming and process? Join Tom Ammon and Russ White as they discuss the problems with scripting, automation, and ease-of-use.

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Hedge 129: Open Source Mentoring

Mentoring is a topic we return to time and again—because it’s one of the most important things we can talk about in terms of building your people skills, your knowledge, and your career. On this episode of the Hedge, Guedis Cardenas joins Tom Ammon and Russ White to talk about open source mentoring. We discuss how this is different than “regular” mentoring, and how it’s the same. Join us as we talk about one of the most important career and personal growth things you can do.

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BGP Policy (Part 7)

At the most basic level, there are only three BGP policies: pushing traffic through a specific exit point; pulling traffic through a specific entry point; preventing a remote AS (more than one AS hop away) from transiting your AS to reach a specific destination. In this series I’m going to discuss different reasons for these kinds of policies, and different ways to implement them in interdomain BGP.

In this post—the last post in this series—I’m going to cover do not transit options from the perspective of AS65001 in the following network—

There are cases where an operator does not traffic to be forwarded to them through some specific AS, whether directly connected or multiple hops away. For instance, AS65001 and AS65005 might be operated by companies in politically unfriendly nations. In this case, AS65001 may be legally required to reject traffic that has passed through the nation in which AS65005 is located. There are at least three mechanisms in BGP that are used, in different situations, to enforce this kind of policy.

Do Not Advertise Communities (Provider Specific)

Many providers supply communities a customer can use to block the advertisement of their routes to a particular AS. For instance, if Continue reading

Live Training: How Routers Really Work

On the 27th of May, I’ll be teaching a three-hour course called How Routers Really Work? From the course description:

This training will peer into the internal components of a router, starting with an explanation of how a router switches packets. This walk through of a switching path, in turn, will be used as a foundation for explaining the components of a router, including the various tables used to build forwarding tables and the software components used to build these tables.

Sign up here.

Hedge 128: Network Engineering at College

Have you ever thought about getting a college degree in computer networking? What are the tradeoffs between this and getting a certification? What is the state of network engineering at colleges—what do current students in network engineering programs think about their programs, and what they wish was there that isn’t? Rick Graziani joins Tom Ammon and Russ White in a broad ranging discussion on network engineering and college. Rick teaches network engineering full time in the Valley.

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BGP Policy (Part 6)

At the most basic level, there are only three BGP policies: pushing traffic through a specific exit point; pulling traffic through a specific entry point; preventing a remote AS (more than one AS hop away) from transiting your AS to reach a specific destination. In this series I’m going to discuss different reasons for these kinds of policies, and different ways to implement them in interdomain BGP.

In this post I’m going to cover local preference via communities, longer prefix match, and conditional advertisement from the perspective of AS65001 in the following network—

Communities an Local Preference
As noted above, MED is the tool “designed into” BGP for selecting an entrance point into the local AS for specific reachable destinations. MED is not very effective, however, because a route’s preference will always win over MED, and because it is not carried between autonomous systems.
Some operators provide an alternate for MED in the form of communities that set a route’s preference within the AS. For instance, assume 100::/64 is geographically closer to the [65001,65003] link than either of the [65001,65002] links, so AS65001 would prefer traffic destined to 100::/64 enter through AS65003.
In this case, AS65001 can advertise 100::/64 with Continue reading

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