One year ago, I looked at the state of adoption of DNSSEC validation in DNS resolvers and the answer was not unreservedly optimistic. Instead of the “up and to the right” curves that show a momentum of adoption, there was a pronounced slowing down aof the momentum of DNSSEC adoption. The current picture of DNSSEC adoption is certainly far more heartening, and I would like to update this earlier article on DNSSEC with more recent data.
There is something quite compelling about engineering a piece of state-of-the-art technology that is intended to be dropped off a boat and then operate flawlessly for the next twenty-five years or more in the silent depths of the world's oceans! It brings together advanced physics, marine technology and engineering to create some truly amazing pieces of netw2orking infrastructure.
Time for another annual roundup from the world of IP addresses. Let's see what has changed in the past 12 months in addressing the Internet and look at how IP address allocation information can inform us of the changing nature of the network itself.
This second part of the report of BGP across 2019 will look at the profile of BGP updates across 2019 to assess whether the stability of the routing system, as measured by the level of BGP update activity, is changing.
It has become a tradition each January for me to report on the behaviour of the inter-domain routing system over the past year, looking in some detail at some metrics from the routing system that can show the essential shape and behaviour of the underlying interconnection fabric of the Internet.
The topic of buffer sizing was the subject of a workshop at Stanford University in early December 2019. The workshop drew together academics, researchers, vendors and operators to look at this topic from their perspectives. The following are my notes from this workshop.
The 106th meeting of the IETF was in Singapore in November 2019. As usual for the IETF, there were many Working Group meetings, and this report is definitely not an attempt to cover all of these meetings or even anything close to that. Here I’ve been highly selective and picked out just the items that I found interesting from the sessions I attended.
DNS OARC held its 31st meeting in Austin, Texas on 31 October to 1 November. Here are some of my highlights from two full days of DNS presentations at this workshop.
The 77th NANOG meeting was held in Austin, Texas at the end of October and they invited Farsight’s Paul Vixie to deliver a keynote presentation. These are my thoughts in response to his presentation, and they are my interpretation of Paul’s talk and more than a few of my opinions thrown in for good measure!
In this article I'd like to look at one particular aspect of the Internet's inter-domain routing framework, namely the role of the Autonomous System (AS) Path in the operation of BGP, and in particular the use of AS Prepending.
This a report on a four-year long experiment in advertising a 'dark' prefix on the internet and examining the profile of unsolicited traffic that is sent to a traffic collector.
Moving the DNS from the access ISP to the browser may not necessarily enhance open competition in the DNS world. In today's Internet just two browsers, Chrome and Safari dominate the browser world with an estimated 80% share of all users. If the DNS becomes a browser-specific setting, then what would that mean for the DNS resolver market? And why should we care? It would be useful to understand what is going on in the DNS today, before there has been any major shift to adopt DoH or DoT by high-use applications such as browsers. Can we measure the level of DNS centrality in the Internet today?
Stories of BGP routing mishaps span the entire thirty-year period that we’ve been using BGP to glue the Internet together. We’ve experienced all kinds of route leaks from a few routes to a few thousand or more. We’ve seen route hijacks that pass by essentially unnoticed, and we’ve seen others that get quoted for the ensuing decade or longer! After some 30 years of running BGP it would be good to believe that we’ve learned from this rich set of accumulated experience, and we now understand how to manage the operation of BGP to keep it secure, stable and accurate. But no. That's is not where we are today. Why is the task to secure this protocol just so hard?
In this article we'll look at DNS Query Name Minimisation in some detail and present the results of our measurement of the current level of use of this resolver query technique in today's Internet.
It may sound a little esoteric, but after a recently exposed Linux vulnerability the setting of the MSS value in a TCP handshake evidently matters. What values are used out there in the Internet today?
At IETF 105, held in Montreal at the end of July, the Technical Plenary part of the meeting had two speakers on the topic of privacy in today's Internet, Associate Professor Arvind Narayanan of Princeton University and Professor Stephen Bellovin of Colombia University. They were both quite disturbing talks in their distinct ways, and I'd like to share my impressions of these two presentations and then consider what privacy means for me in today's Internet.
DNSSEC is often viewed as a solution looking for a problem. It seems only logical that there is some intrinsic value in being able to explicitly verify the veracity and currency of responses received from DNS queries, yet fleshing this proposition out with practical examples has proved challenging. Where else might DNSSEC be useful?
In June I participated in a workshop, organized by the Internet Architecture Board, on the topic of protocol design and effect, looking at the differences between initial design expectations and deployment realities. These are my impressions of the discussions that took place at this workshop.
The first RFC describing BGP, RFC 1105, was published in June 1989, thirty years ago. That makes BGP a venerable protocol in the internet context and considering that it holds the Internet together it's still a central piece of the Internet's infrastructure. How has this critically important routing protocol fared over these thirty years and what are its future prospects? It BGP approaching its dotage or will it be a feature of the Internet for decades to come?