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Category Archives for "Errata Security"

Notes on setting up Raspberry Pi 3 as WiFi hotspot

I want to sniff the packets for IoT devices. There are a number of ways of doing this, but one straightforward mechanism is configuring a "Raspberry Pi 3 B" as a WiFi hotspot, then running tcpdump on it to record all the packets that pass through it. Google gives lots of results on how to do this, but they all demand that you have the precise hardware, WiFi hardware, and software that the authors do, so that's a pain.


I got it working using the instructions here. There are a few additional notes, which is why I'm writing this blogpost, so I remember them.
https://www.raspberrypi.org/documentation/configuration/wireless/access-point.md

I'm using the RPi-3-B and not the RPi-3-B+, and the latest version of Raspbian at the time of this writing, "Raspbian Stretch Lite 2018-3-13".

Some things didn't work as described. The first is that it couldn't find the package "hostapd". That solution was to run "apt-get update" a second time.

The second problem was error message about the NAT not working when trying to set the masquerade rule. That's because the 'upgrade' updates the kernel, making the running system out-of-date with the files on the disk. The solution to that is make Continue reading

My letter urging Georgia governor to veto anti-hacking bill

February 16, 2018

Office of the Governor
206 Washington Street
111 State Capitol
Atlanta, Georgia 30334


Re: SB 315

Dear Governor Deal:

I am writing to urge you to veto SB315, the "Unauthorized Computer Access" bill.

The cybersecurity community, of which Georgia is a leader, is nearly unanimous that SB315 will make cybersecurity worse. You've undoubtedly heard from many of us opposing this bill. It does not help in prosecuting foreign hackers who target Georgian computers, such as our elections systems. Instead, it prevents those who notice security flaws from pointing them out, thereby getting them fixed. This law violates the well-known Kirchhoff's Principle, that instead of secrecy and obscurity, that security is achieved through transparency and openness.

That the bill contains this flaw is no accident. The justification for this bill comes from an incident where a security researcher noticed a Georgia state election system had made voter information public. This remained unfixed, months after the vulnerability was first disclosed, leaving the data exposed. Those in charge decided that it was better to prosecute those responsible for discovering the flaw rather than punish those who failed to secure Georgia voter information, hence this law.

Too many security experts oppose Continue reading

Let’s stop talking about password strength

Picture from EFF -- CC-BY license
Near the top of most security recommendations is to use "strong passwords". We need to stop doing this.

Yes, weak passwords can be a problem. If a website gets hacked, weak passwords are easier to crack. It's not that this is wrong advice.

On the other hand, it's not particularly good advice, either. It's far down the list of important advice that people need to remember. "Weak passwords" are nowhere near the risk of "password reuse". When your Facebook or email account gets hacked, it's because you used the same password across many websites, not because you used a weak password.

Important websites, where the strength of your password matters, already take care of the problem. They use strong, salted hashes on the backend to protect the password. On the frontend, they force passwords to be a certain length and a certain complexity. Maybe the better advice is to not trust any website that doesn't enforce stronger passwords (minimum of 8 characters consisting of both letters and non-letters).

To some extent, this "strong password" advice has become obsolete. A decade ago, websites had poor protection (MD5 hashes) and no enforcement of complexity, so it Continue reading

Why the crypto-backdoor side is morally corrupt

Crypto-backdoors for law enforcement is a reasonable position, but the side that argues for it adds things that are either outright lies or morally corrupt. Every year, the amount of digital evidence law enforcement has to solve crimes increases, yet they outrageously lie, claiming they are "going dark", losing access to evidence. A weirder claim is that  those who oppose crypto-backdoors are nonetheless ethically required to make them work. This is morally corrupt.

That's the point of this Lawfare post, which claims:
What I am saying is that those arguing that we should reject third-party access out of hand haven’t carried their research burden. ... There are two reasons why I think there hasn’t been enough research to establish the no-third-party access position. First, research in this area is “taboo” among security researchers. ... the second reason why I believe more research needs to be done: the fact that prominent non-government experts are publicly willing to try to build secure third-party-access solutions should make the information-security community question the consensus view. 
This is nonsense. It's like claiming we haven't cured the common cold because researchers haven't spent enough effort at it. When researchers claim they've tried 10,000 ways to make Continue reading

WannaCry after one year

In the news, Boeing (an aircraft maker) has been "targeted by a WannaCry virus attack". Phrased this way, it's implausible. There are no new attacks targeting people with WannaCry. There is either no WannaCry, or it's simply a continuation of the attack from a year ago.


It's possible what happened is that an anti-virus product called a new virus "WannaCry". Virus families are often related, and sometimes a distant relative gets called the same thing. I know this watching the way various anti-virus products label my own software, which isn't a virus, but which virus writers often include with their own stuff. The Lazarus group, which is believed to be responsible for WannaCry, have whole virus families like this. Thus, just because an AV product claims you are infected with WannaCry doesn't mean it's the same thing that everyone else is calling WannaCry.

Famously, WannaCry was the first virus/ransomware/worm that used the NSA ETERNALBLUE exploit. Other viruses have since added the exploit, and of course, hackers use it when attacking systems. It may be that a network intrusion detection system detected ETERNALBLUE, which people then assumed was due to WannaCry. It may actually have been an nPetya infection instead (nPetya Continue reading

What John Oliver gets wrong about Bitcoin

John Oliver covered bitcoin/cryptocurrencies last night. I thought I'd describe a bunch of things he gets wrong.


How Bitcoin works

Nowhere in the show does it describe what Bitcoin is and how it works.

Discussions should always start with Satoshi Nakamoto's original paper. The thing Satoshi points out is that there is an important cost to normal transactions, namely, the entire legal system designed to protect you against fraud, such as the way you can reverse the transactions on your credit card if it gets stolen. The point of Bitcoin is that there is no way to reverse a charge. A transaction is done via cryptography: to transfer money to me, you decrypt it with your secret key and encrypt it with mine, handing ownership over to me with no third party involved that can reverse the transaction, and essentially no overhead.

All the rest of the stuff, like the decentralized blockchain and mining, is all about making that work.

Bitcoin crazies forget about the original genesis of Bitcoin. For example, they talk about adding features to stop fraud, reversing transactions, and having a central authority that manages that. This misses the point, because the existing electronic banking system already Continue reading

Some notes on memcached DDoS

I thought I'd write up some notes on the memcached DDoS. Specifically, I describe how many I found scanning the Internet with masscan, and how to use masscan as a killswitch to neuter the worst of the attacks.


Test your servers

I added code to my port scanner for this, then scanned the Internet:

masscan 0.0.0.0/0 -pU:11211 --banners | grep memcached

This example scans the entire Internet (/0). Replaced 0.0.0.0/0 with your address range (or ranges).

This produces output that looks like this:

Banner on port 11211/udp on 172.246.132.226: [memcached] uptime=230130 time=1520485357 version=1.4.13
Banner on port 11211/udp on 89.110.149.218: [memcached] uptime=3935192 time=1520485363 version=1.4.17
Banner on port 11211/udp on 172.246.132.226: [memcached] uptime=230130 time=1520485357 version=1.4.13
Banner on port 11211/udp on 84.200.45.2: [memcached] uptime=399858 time=1520485362 version=1.4.20
Banner on port 11211/udp on 5.1.66.2: [memcached] uptime=29429482 time=1520485363 version=1.4.20
Banner on port 11211/udp on 103.248.253.112: [memcached] uptime=2879363 time=1520485366 version=1.2.6
Banner on port 11211/udp on 193.240.236.171: [memcached] uptime=42083736 time=1520485365 version=1.4.13

The "banners" check filters out Continue reading

AskRob: Does Tor let government peek at vuln info?

On Twitter, somebody asked this question:



The question is about a blog post that claims Tor privately tips off the government about vulnerabilities, using as proof a "vulnerability" from October 2007 that wasn't made public until 2011.

The tl;dr is that it's bunk. There was no vulnerability, it was a feature request. The details were already public. There was no spy agency involved, but the agency that does Voice of America, and which tries to protect activists under foreign repressive regimes.

Discussion

The issue is that Tor traffic looks like Tor traffic, making it easy to block/censor, or worse, identify users. Over the years, Tor has added features to make it look more and more like normal traffic, like the encrypted traffic used by Facebook, Google, and Apple. Tors improves this bit-by-bit over time, but short of actually piggybacking on website traffic, it will always leave some telltale signature.

An example showing how we can distinguish Tor traffic is the packet below, from the latest version of the Tor server:


Had this been Google or Facebook, the names would be something like "www.google.com" or "facebook.com". Continue reading

Blame privacy activists for the Memo??

Former FBI agent Asha Rangappa @AshaRangappa_ has a smart post debunking the Nunes Memo, then takes it all back again with an op-ed on the NYTimes blaming us privacy activists. She presents an obviously false narrative that the FBI and FISA courts are above suspicion.

I know from first hand experience the FBI is corrupt. In 2007, they threatened me, trying to get me to cancel a talk that revealed security vulnerabilities in a large corporation's product. Such abuses occur because there is no transparency and oversight. FBI agents write down our conversation in their little notebooks instead of recording it, so that they can control the narrative of what happened, presenting their version of the converstion (leaving out the threats). In this day and age of recording devices, this is indefensible.

She writes "I know firsthand that it’s difficult to get a FISA warrant". Yes, the process was difficult for her, an underling, to get a FISA warrant. The process is different when a leader tries to do the same thing.

I know this first hand having casually worked as an outsider with intelligence agencies. I saw two processes in place: one for the flunkies, and Continue reading

The problematic Wannacry North Korea attribution

Last month, the US government officially "attributed" the Wannacry ransomware worm to North Korea. This attribution has three flaws, which are a good lesson for attribution in general.

It was an accident

The most important fact about Wannacry is that it was an accident. We've had 30 years of experience with Internet worms teaching us that worms are always accidents. While launching worms may be intentional, their effects cannot be predicted. While they appear to have targets, like Slammer against South Korea, or Witty against the Pentagon, further analysis shows this was just a random effect that was impossible to predict ahead of time. Only in hindsight are these effects explainable.

We should hold those causing accidents accountable, too, but it's a different accountability. The U.S. has caused more civilian deaths in its War on Terror than the terrorists caused triggering that war. But we hold these to be morally different: the terrorists targeted the innocent, whereas the U.S. takes great pains to avoid civilian casualties. 

Since we are talking about blaming those responsible for accidents, we also must include the NSA in that mix. The NSA created, then allowed the release of, weaponized exploits. That's Continue reading

“Skyfall attack” was attention seeking

After the Meltdown/Spectre attacks, somebody created a website promising related "Skyfall/Solace" attacks. They revealed today that it was a "hoax".

It was a bad hoax. It wasn't a clever troll, parody, or commentary. It was childish behavior seeking attention.

For all you hate naming of security vulnerabilities, Meltdown/Spectre was important enough to deserve a name. Sure, from an infosec perspective, it was minor, we just patch and move on. But from an operating-system and CPU design perspective, these things where huge.

Page table isolation to fix Meltdown is a fundamental redesign of the operating system. What you learned in college about how Solaris, Windows, Linux, and BSD were designed is now out-of-date. It's on the same scale of change as address space randomization.

The same is true of Spectre. It changes what capabilities are given to JavaScript (buffers and high resolution timers). It dramatically increases the paranoia we have of running untrusted code from the Internet. We've been cleansing JavaScript of things like buffer-overflows and type confusion errors, now we have to cleanse it of branch prediction issues.

Moreover, not only do we need to change software, we need to change the CPU. No, we won't get rid of branch-prediction Continue reading

Some notes on Meltdown/Spectre

I thought I'd write up some notes.

You don't have to worry if you patch. If you download the latest update from Microsoft, Apple, or Linux, then the problem is fixed for you and you don't have to worry. If you aren't up to date, then there's a lot of other nasties out there you should probably also be worrying about. I mention this because while this bug is big in the news, it's probably not news the average consumer needs to concern themselves with.

This will force a redesign of CPUs and operating systems. While not a big news item for consumers, it's huge in the geek world. We'll need to redesign operating systems and how CPUs are made.

Don't worry about the performance hit. Some, especially avid gamers, are concerned about the claims of "30%" performance reduction when applying the patch. That's only in some rare cases, so you shouldn't worry too much about it. As far as I can tell, 3D games aren't likely to see less than 1% performance degradation. If you imagine your game is suddenly slower after the patch, then something else broke it.

This wasn't foreseeable. A common cliche is that such bugs Continue reading

Why Meltdown exists

So I thought I'd answer this question. I'm not a "chipmaker", but I've been optimizing low-level assembly x86 assembly language for a couple of decades.





The tl;dr version is this: the CPUs have no bug. The results are correct, it's just that the timing is different. CPU designers will never fix the general problem of undetermined timing.

CPUs are deterministic in the results they produce. If you add 5+6, you always get 11 -- always. On the other hand, the amount of time they take is non-deterministic. Run a benchmark on your computer. Now run it again. The amount of time it took varies, for a lot of reasons.

That CPUs take an unknown amount of time is an inherent problem in CPU design. Even if you do everything right, "interrupts" from clock timers and network cards will still cause undefined timing problems. Therefore, CPU designers have thrown the concept of "deterministic time" out Continue reading

Let’s see if I’ve got Metldown right

I thought I'd write down the proof-of-concept to see if I got it right.

So the Meltdown paper lists the following steps:

 ; flush cache
 ; rcx = kernel address
 ; rbx = probe array
 retry:
 mov al, byte [rcx]
 shl rax, 0xc
 jz retry
 mov rbx, qword [rbx + rax]
 ; measure which of 256 cachelines were accessed

So the first step is to flush the cache, so that none of the 256 possible cache lines in our "probe array" are in the cache. There are many ways this can be done.

Now pick a byte of secret kernel memory to read. Presumably, we'll just read all of memory, one byte at a time. The address of this byte is in rcx.

Now execute the instruction:
    mov al, byte [rcx]
This line of code will crash (raise an exception). That's because [rcx] points to secret kernel memory which we don't have permission to read. The value of the real al (the low-order byte of rax) will never actually change.

But fear not! Intel is massively out-of-order. That means before the exception happens, it will provisionally and partially execute the following instructions. While Intel has only 16 Continue reading

Bitcoin: In Crypto We Trust

Tim Wu, who coined "net neutrality", has written an op-ed on the New York Times called "The Bitcoin Boom: In Code We Trust". He is wrong is wrong about "code".

The wrong "trust"

Wu builds a big manifesto about how real-world institutions aren't can't be trusted. Certainly, this reflects the rhetoric from a vocal wing of Bitcoin fanatics, but it's not the Bitcoin manifesto.

Instead, the word "trust" in the Bitcoin paper is much narrower, referring to how online merchants can't trust credit-cards (for example). When I bought school supplies for my niece when she studied in Canada, the online site wouldn't accept my U.S. credit card. They didn't trust my credit card. However, they trusted my Bitcoin, so I used that payment method instead, and succeeded in the purchase.

Real-world currencies like dollars are tethered to the real-world, which means no single transaction can be trusted, because "they" (the credit-card company, the courts, etc.) may decide to reverse the transaction. The manifesto behind Bitcoin is that a transaction cannot be reversed -- and thus, can always be trusted.

Deliberately confusing the micro-trust in a transaction and macro-trust in banks and governments is a sort of Continue reading

Libertarians are against net neutrality

This post claims to be by a libertarian in support of net neutrality. As a libertarian, I need to debunk this. "Net neutrality" is a case of one-hand clapping, you rarely hear the competing side, and thus, that side may sound attractive. This post is about the other side, from a libertarian point of view.



That post just repeats the common, and wrong, left-wing talking points. I mean, there might be a libertarian case for some broadband regulation, but this isn't it.

This thing they call "net neutrality" is just left-wing politics masquerading as some sort of principle. It's no different than how people claim to be "pro-choice", yet demand forced vaccinations. Or, it's no different than how people claim to believe in "traditional marriage" even while they are on their third "traditional marriage".

Properly defined, "net neutrality" means no discrimination of network traffic. But nobody wants that. A classic example is how most internet connections have faster download speeds than uploads. This discriminates against upload traffic, harming innovation in upload-centric applications like DropBox's cloud backup or BitTorrent's peer-to-peer file transfer. Yet activists never mention this, or other types of network traffic discrimination, because they no more care about "net Continue reading

A Thanksgiving Carol: How Those Smart Engineers at Twitter Screwed Me

Thanksgiving Holiday is a time for family and cheer. Well, a time for family. It's the holiday where we ask our doctor relatives to look at that weird skin growth, and for our geek relatives to fix our computers. This tale is of such computer support, and how the "smart" engineers at Twitter have ruined this for life.

My mom is smart, but not a good computer user. I get my enthusiasm for science and math from my mother, and she has no problem understanding the science of computers. She keeps up when I explain Bitcoin. But she has difficulty using computers. She has this emotional, irrational belief that computers are out to get her.

This makes helping her difficult. Every problem is described in terms of what the computer did to her, not what she did to her computer. It's the computer that needs to be fixed, instead of the user. When I showed her the "haveibeenpwned.com" website (part of my tips for securing computers), it showed her Tumblr password had been hacked. She swore she never created a Tumblr account -- that somebody or something must have done it for her. Except, I was Continue reading

Don Jr.: I’ll bite

So Don Jr. tweets the following, which is an excellent troll. So I thought I'd bite. The reason is I just got through debunk Democrat claims about NetNeutrality, so it seems like a good time to balance things out and debunk Trump nonsense.

The issue here is not which side is right. The issue here is whether you stand for truth, or whether you'll seize any factoid that appears to support your side, regardless of the truthfulness of it. The ACLU obviously chose falsehoods, as I documented. In the following tweet, Don Jr. does the same.

It's a preview of the hyperpartisan debates are you are likely to have across the dinner table tomorrow, which each side trying to outdo the other in the false-hoods they'll claim.

What we see in this number is a steady trend of these statistics since the Great Recession, with no evidence Continue reading

NetNeutrality vs. limiting FaceTime

In response to my tweets/blogs against NetNeutrality, people have asked: what about these items? In this post, I debunk the fourth item.
The issue the fourth item addresses is how AT&T restrict the use of Apple's FaceTime on its network back in 2012. This seems a clear NetNeutrality issue.

But here's the thing: the FCC allowed these restrictions, despite the FCC's "Open Internet" order forbidding such things. In other words, despite the graphic's claims it "happened without net neutrality rules", the opposite is true, it happened with net neutrality rules.

The FCC explains why they allowed it in their own case study on the matter. The short version is this: AT&T's network couldn't handle the traffic, so it was appropriate to restrict it until some time in the future (the LTE rollout) until it could. The issue wasn't that AT&T was restricting FaceTime in favor of its own video-calling service (it didn't have one), but it was instead an issue of "bandwidth management".

When Apple released FaceTime, they Continue reading

NetNeutrality vs. Verizon censoring Naral

In response to my anti-NetNeutrality blogs/tweets, people ask what about this? In this post, I address the second question.
Firstly, it's not a NetNeutrality issue (which applies only to the Internet), but an issue with text-messages. In other words, it's something that will continue to happen even with NetNeutrality rules. People relate this to NetNeutrality as an analogy, not because it actually is such an issue.

Secondly, it's an edge/content issue, not a transit issue. The details in this case is that Verizon provides a program for sending bulk messages to its customers from the edge of the network. Verizon isn't censoring text messages in transit, but from the edge. You can send a text message to your friend on the Verizon network, and it won't be censored. Thus the analogy is incorrect -- the correct analogy would be with content providers like Twitter and Facebook, not ISPs like Comcast.

Like all cell phone vendors, Verizon polices this content, canceling accounts that abuse the system, like spammers. Continue reading
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