Ivan Pepelnjak

Author Archives: Ivan Pepelnjak

Optimizing the Time-to-First-Byte

I don’t think I’ve ever met someone saying “I wish my web application would run slower.” Everyone wants their stuff to run faster, but most environments are not willing to pay the cost (rearchitecting the application). Welcome to the wonderful world of PowerPoint “solutions”.

The obvious answer: The Cloud. Let’s move our web servers closer to the clients – deploy them in various cloud regions around the world. Mission accomplished.

Not really; the laws of physics (latency in particular) will kill your wonderful idea. I wrote about the underlying problems years ago, wrote another blog post focused on the misconceptions of cloudbursting, but I’m still getting the questions along the same lines. Time for another blog post, this time with even more diagrams.

Optimizing the Time-to-First-Byte

I don’t think I’ve ever met someone saying “I wish my web application would run slower.” Everyone wants their stuff to run faster, but most environments are not willing to pay the cost (rearchitecting the application). Welcome to the wonderful world of PowerPoint “solutions”.

The obvious answer: The Cloud. Let’s move our web servers closer to the clients – deploy them in various cloud regions around the world. Mission accomplished.

Not really; the laws of physics (latency in particular) will kill your wonderful idea. I wrote about the underlying problems years ago, wrote another blog post focused on the misconceptions of cloudbursting, but I’m still getting the questions along the same lines. Time for another blog post, this time with even more diagrams.

Overlay Virtual Networking Examples

One of ipSpace.net subscribers wanted to see a real-life examples in the Overlay Virtual Networking webinar:

I would be nice to have real world examples. The webinar lacks of contents about how to obtain a fully working L3 fabric overlay network, including gateways, vrfs, security zones, etc… I know there is not only one “design for all” but a few complete architectures from L2 to L7 will be appreciated over deep-dives about specific protocols or technologies.

Most ipSpace.net webinars are bits of a larger puzzle. In this particular case:

Overlay Virtual Networking Examples

One of ipSpace.net subscribers wanted to see a real-life examples in the Overlay Virtual Networking webinar:

I would be nice to have real world examples. The webinar lacks of contents about how to obtain a fully working L3 fabric overlay network, including gateways, vrfs, security zones, etc… I know there is not only one “design for all” but a few complete architectures from L2 to L7 will be appreciated over deep-dives about specific protocols or technologies.

Most ipSpace.net webinars are bits of a larger puzzle. In this particular case:

Interesting: What’s Wrong with Bitcoin

I read tons of articles debunking the blockchain hype, and the stupidity of waisting CPU cycles and electricity on calculating meaningless hashes; here’s a totally different take on the subject by Avery Pennarun (an update written ten years later).

TL&DR: Bitcoin is a return to gold standard, and people who know more about economy than GPUs and hash functions have figured out that’s a bad idea long time ago.

Non-Stop Routing (NSR) 101

After Non-Stop Forwarding, Stateful Switchover and Graceful Restart, it’s time for the pinnacle of high-availability switching: Non-Stop Routing (NSR)1.

The PowerPoint-level description of this idea sounds fantastic:

  • A device runs two active copies of its control plane.
  • There is no cold/warm start of the backup control plane. The failover is almost instantaneous.
  • The state of all control plane protocols is continuously synchronized between the two control plane instances. If one of them fails, the other one continues running.
  • A failure of a control plane instance is thus invisible from the outside.

If this sounds an awful lot like VMware Fault Tolerance, you’re not too far off the mark.

Non-Stop Routing (NSR) 101

After Non-Stop Forwarding, Stateful Switchover and Graceful Restart, it’s time for the pinnacle of high-availability switching: Non-Stop Routing (NSR)1.

The PowerPoint-level description of this idea sounds fantastic:

  • A device runs two active copies of its control plane.
  • There is no cold/warm start of the backup control plane. The failover is almost instantaneous.
  • The state of all control plane protocols is continuously synchronized between the two control plane instances. If one of them fails, the other one continues running.
  • A failure of a control plane instance is thus invisible from the outside.

If this sounds an awful lot like VMware Fault Tolerance, you’re not too far off the mark.

Building a Separate Infrastructure for Guest Access

One of my readers sent me an age-old question:

I have my current guest network built on top of my production network. The separation between guest- and corporate network is done using a VLAN – once you connect to the wireless guest network, you’re in guest VLAN that forwards your packets to a guest router and off toward the Internet.

Our security team claims that this design is not secure enough. They claim a user would be able to attach somehow to the switch and jump between VLANs, suggesting that it would be better to run guest access over a separate physical network.

Decades ago, VLAN implementations were buggy, and it was possible (using a carefully crafted stack of VLAN tags) to insert packets from one VLAN to another (see also: VLAN hopping).

Building a Separate Infrastructure for Guest Access

One of my readers sent me an age-old question:

I have my current guest network built on top of my production network. The separation between guest- and corporate network is done using a VLAN – once you connect to the wireless guest network, you’re in guest VLAN that forwards your packets to a guest router and off toward the Internet.

Our security team claims that this design is not secure enough. They claim a user would be able to attach somehow to the switch and jump between VLANs, suggesting that it would be better to run guest access over a separate physical network.

Decades ago, VLAN implementations were buggy, and it was possible (using a carefully crafted stack of VLAN tags) to insert packets from one VLAN to another (see also: VLAN hopping).

Creating BGP Multipath Lab with netsim-tools

I was editing the BGP Multipathing video in the Advanced Routing Protocols section of How Networks Really Work webinar, got to the diagram I used to explain the intricacies of IBGP multipathing and said to myself “that should be easy (and fun) to set up with netsim-tools”.

Fifteen minutes later1 I had the lab up and running and could verify that BGP works exactly the way I explained it in the webinar (at least on Cisco IOS).

Creating BGP Multipath Lab with netlab

I was editing the BGP Multipathing video in the Advanced Routing Protocols section of How Networks Really Work webinar, got to the diagram I used to explain the intricacies of IBGP multipathing and said to myself “that should be easy (and fun) to set up with netlab”.

Fifteen minutes later1 I had the lab up and running and could verify that BGP works exactly the way I explained it in the webinar.

Soap Opera: SRv6 Is Insecure

I heard about SRv6 when it was still on the drawing board, and my initial reaction was “Another attempt to implement source routing. We know how that ends.” The then-counter-argument by one of the proponents went along the lines of “but we’ll use signed headers to prevent abuse” and I thought “yeah, that will work really well in silicon implementations”.

Years later, Andrew Alston decided to document the state of the emperor’s wardrobe (TL&DR: of course SRv6 is insecure and can be easily abused) and the counter-argument this time was “but that applies to any tunnel technology”. Thank you, we knew that all along, and that’s not what was promised.

You might want to browse the rest of that email thread; it’s fun reading unless you built your next-generation network design on SRv6 running across third-party networks… which was another PowerPoint case study used by SRv6 proponents.

Soap Opera: SRv6 Is Insecure

I heard about SRv6 when it was still on the drawing board, and my initial reaction was “Another attempt to implement source routing. We know how that ends.” The then-counter-argument by one of the proponents went along the lines of “but we’ll use signed headers to prevent abuse” and I thought “yeah, that will work really well in silicon implementations”.

Years later, Andrew Alston decided to document the state of the emperor’s wardrobe (TL&DR: of course SRv6 is insecure and can be easily abused) and the counter-argument this time was “but that applies to any tunnel technology”. Thank you, we knew that all along, and that’s not what was promised.

You might want to browse the rest of that email thread; it’s fun reading unless you built your next-generation network design on SRv6 running across third-party networks… which was another PowerPoint case study used by SRv6 proponents.

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