Russ

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Security ‘net: Privacy and Cybercrime Edition

DDoS blackmail is an increasingly common form of cybercrime, it appears. The general pattern is something like this: the administrator of a large corporate site receives an email, threatening a large scale DDoS attack unless the company deposits some amount of bitcoin in an untraceable account. Sometimes, if the company doesn’t comply, the blackmail is followed up with a small “sample attack,” and a second contact or email asking for more bitcoin than the first time.

The best reaction to these types of things is either to work with your service provider to hunker down and block the attack, or to simply ignore the threat. For instance, there has been a spate of threats from someone called Armada Collective over the last several weeks that appear to be completely empty; while threats have been reported, no action appears to have been taken.

We heard from more than 100 existing and prospective CloudFlare customers who had received the Armada Collective’s emailed threats. We’ve also compared notes with other DDoS mitigation vendors with customers that had received similar threats. -via Cloudflare

The bottom line is this: you should never pay against these threats. It’s always better to contact your provider and work Continue reading

Securing BGP: A Case Study (9)

There are a number of systems that have been proposed to validate (or secure) the path in BGP. To finish off this series on BGP as a case study, I only want to look at three of them. At some point in the future, I will probably write a couple of posts on what actually seems to be making it to some sort of deployment stage, but for now I just want to compare various proposals against the requirements outlined in the last post on this topic (you can find that post here).securing-bgp

The first of these systems is BGPSEC—or as it was known before it was called BGPSEC, S-BGP. I’m not going to spend a lot of time explaining how S-BGP works, as I’ve written a series of posts over at Packet Pushers on this very topic:

Part 1: Basic Operation
Part 2: Protections Offered
Part 3: Replays, Timers, and Performance
Part 4: Signatures and Performance
Part 5: Leaks

Considering S-BGP against the requirements:

  • Centralized versus decentralized balance:S-BGP distributes path validation information throughout the internetwork, as this information is actually contained in a new attribute carried with route advertisements. Authorization and authentication are implicitly centralized, however, with the Continue reading

New Ways of Thinking

Rule 11 definitely applies to most new technology that’s being hyped (and overhyped) in the networking world. But while some things stay the same, others actually do change. From one of my readers—

Much of the current “trends” in networking are largely just new marketing-speak on old concepts, but some (I’ll propose) are actually new, or require new ways of thinking—which is which, or for a simpler version: how (really) should I change my thinking to reflect the new-networking-order?

This question rebounds through the networking industry today—how, really, do I need to change my thinking to cope with the new networking order? There are, on the face of it, three options available. Let me begin with a story from a prior career to set the stage.

A long time ago, in a galaxy far away, I worked on airfield electronics and communication systems. Things like RADAR systems, wind speed measurement systems, TACANs, VORs, crypto hardware, MUX’s, inverse MUX’s, and even telephone switches. There was a point when I saw something interesting happening where I lived and spent my time. The TACAN and VOR, for instance, were replaced by new gear. Instead of half splitting, measuring things, and replacing individual components, Continue reading