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Worth Exploring: BGP from Theory to Practice

My good friend Tiziano Tofoni finally created an English version of his evergreen classic BGP from theory to practice with co-authors Antonio Prado and Flavio Luciani.

I had the Italian version of the book since the days I was running SDN workshops with Tiziano in Rome, and it’s really nice to see they finally decided to address a wider market.

Also, you know what would go well with that book? Free open-source BGP configuration labs of course 😉

Early Data-Link Layer Addressing

After covering the theoretical part of network addressing (part 2, part 3), let’s go into some practical examples. I’ll start with data link layer and then move on to networking and higher layers.

The earliest data link implementations that were not point-to-point links were multi-drop links and I mentioned them in the networking challenges part of the webinar. Initially, we implemented multi-drop links with modems, but even today you can see multi-drop in satellite communications, Wi-Fi, or in cable modems.

Early Data-Link Layer Addressing

After covering the theoretical part of network addressing (part 2, part 3), let’s go into some practical examples. I’ll start with data link layer and then move on to networking and higher layers.

The earliest data link implementations that were not point-to-point links were multi-drop links and I mentioned them in the networking challenges part of the webinar. Initially, we implemented multi-drop links with modems, but even today you can see multi-drop in satellite communications, Wi-Fi, or in cable modems.

BGP Labs: Multivendor External Routers

A quick update BGP Labs project status update: now that netlab release 1.6.4 is out I could remove the dependency on using Cumulus Linux as the external BGP router.

You can use any device that is supported by bgp.session and bgp.policy plugins as the external BGP router. You could use Arista EOS, Aruba AOS-CX, Cisco IOSv, Cisco IOS-XE, Cumulus Linux or FRR as external BGP routers with netlab release 1.6.4, and I’m positive Jeroen van Bemmel will add Nokia SR Linux to that list.

If you’re not ready for a netlab upgrade, you can keep using Cumulus Linux as external BGP routers (I’ll explain the behind-the-scenes magic in another blog post, I’m at the Deep Conference this week).

For more details read the updated BGP Labs Software Installation and Lab Setup guide.

BGP Labs: Multivendor External Routers

Here’s a quick update on the BGP Labs project status: now that netlab release 1.6.4 is out, I could remove the dependency on using Cumulus Linux as the external BGP router.

You can use any device that is supported by bgp.session and bgp.policy plugins as the external BGP router. You could use Arista EOS, Aruba AOS-CX, Cisco IOSv, Cisco IOS-XE, Cumulus Linux or FRR as external BGP routers with netlab release 1.6.4, and I’m positive Jeroen van Bemmel will add Nokia SR Linux to that list.

If you’re not ready for a netlab upgrade, you can keep using Cumulus Linux as external BGP routers (I’ll explain the behind-the-scenes magic in another blog post, I’m at the Deep Conference this week).

For more details, read the updated BGP Labs Software Installation and Lab Setup guide.

netlab 1.6.4: Support for Multi-Lab Projects; More BGP Goodies

Features in netlab release 1.6.4 were driven primarily by the needs of my BGP labs project:

Numerous platforms already support the new BGP nerd knobs:

netlab 1.6.4: Support for Multi-Lab Projects; More BGP Goodies

Features in netlab release 1.6.4 were driven primarily by the needs of my BGP labs project:

Numerous platforms already support the new BGP nerd knobs:

Video: History of BGP Route Leaks

I’ll be talking about Internet routing security at the Deep conference in a few days, and just in case you won’t be able to make it1 ;) here’s the first bit of my talk: a very brief history of BGP route leaks2.

Note: you’ll find more Network Security Fallacies videos in the How Networks Really Work webinar.

You need at least free ipSpace.net subscription to watch videos in this webinar.

Video: History of BGP Route Leaks

I’ll be talking about Internet routing security at the Deep conference in a few days, and just in case you won’t be able to make it1 ;) here’s the first bit of my talk: a very brief history of BGP route leaks2.

Note: you’ll find more Network Security Fallacies videos in the How Networks Really Work webinar.

You need at least free ipSpace.net subscription to watch videos in this webinar.

Will Network Devices Reject BGP Sessions from Unknown Sources?

TL&DR: Violating the Betteridge’s Law of Headlines, the answer is “Yes, but the devil is in the details.

It all started with the following observation by Minh Ha left as a comment to my previous BGP session security blog post:

I’d think it’d be obvious for BGP routers to only accept incoming sessions from configured BGP neighbors, right? Because BGP is the most critical infrastructure, the backbone of the Internet, why would you want your router to accept incoming session from anyone but KNOWN sources?

Following my “opinions are good, facts are better” mantra, I decided to run a few tests before opinionating1.

Will Network Devices Reject BGP Sessions from Unknown Sources?

TL&DR: Violating the Betteridge’s Law of Headlines, the answer is “Yes, but the devil is in the details.

It all started with the following observation by Minh Ha left as a comment to my previous BGP session security blog post:

I’d think it’d be obvious for BGP routers to only accept incoming sessions from configured BGP neighbors, right? Because BGP is the most critical infrastructure, the backbone of the Internet, why would you want your router to accept incoming session from anyone but KNOWN sources?

Following my “opinions are good, facts are better” mantra, I decided to run a few tests before opinionating1.

Worth Reading: AI Risks

Bruce Schneier wrote a thoughtful article on the various perceptions of AI Risks including this gem:

As the science-fiction author Ted Chiang has said, fears about the existential risks of AI are really fears about the threat of uncontrolled capitalism, and dystopias like the paper clip maximizer are just caricatures of every start-up’s business plan.

Enjoy!

Worth Reading: AI Risks

Bruce Schneier wrote a thoughtful article on the various perceptions of AI Risks including this gem:

As the science-fiction author Ted Chiang has said, fears about the existential risks of AI are really fears about the threat of uncontrolled capitalism, and dystopias like the paper clip maximizer are just caricatures of every start-up’s business plan.

Enjoy!

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