When you think of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, you probably think about an attack which overflows the bandwidth available on a single link; or overflowing the number of half open TCP sessions a device can have open at once, preventing the device from accepting more sessions. In all cases, a DoS or DDoS attack will involve a lot of traffic being pushed at a single device, or across a single link.
But if you look at an entire system, there are a lot of places where resources are scarce, and hence are places where resources could be consumed in a way that prevents services from operating correctly. Such attacks would not need to be distributed, because they could take much less traffic than is traditionally required to deny a service. These kinds of attacks are called tail attacks, because they attack the long tail of resource pools, where these pools are much Continue reading
When you see a chart like this—
—you probably think if I were staking my career on technologies, I would want to jump from the older technology to the new just at the point where that adoption curve starts to really drive upward.
Going back many years, I recognize this s-curve. It was used for FDDI, ATM, Banyan Vines, Novell Netware, and just about every new technology that has ever entered the market.
The problem with this curve, Continue reading
Did the passage of gDPR impact the amount of spam on the ‘net, or not? It depends on who you ask.
The folks at the Recorded Future blog examined the volume of spam and the number of registrations for domains used in phishing activity, and determined the volume of spam was not impacted by the implementation of Europe’s new privacy laws.
To understand the effect of GDPR, the relevant questions are: Is GDPR enabling damage, because it makes detection, blocking, and mitigation harder?
Note that the CircleID article only addresses the domain registration question, and does Continue reading
The DNS system is, unfortunately, rife with holes like Swiss Cheese; man-in-the-middle attacks can easily negate the operation of TLS and web site security. To resolve these problems, the IETF and the DNS community standardized a set of cryptographic extensions to cryptographically sign all DNS records. These signatures rely on public/private key pairs that are transitively signed (forming a signature chain) from individual subdomains through the Top Level Domain (TLD). Now that these standards are in place, how heavily is DNSSEC being used in the wild? How much safer are we from man-in-the-middle attacks against TLS and other transport encryption mechanisms?
Three researchers published an article in Winter ;login; describing their research into answering this question (membership and login required to read the original article). The result? While more than 90% of the TLDs in DNS are DNSEC enabled, DNSSEC is still not widely deployed or used. To make matter worse, where it is deployed, it isn’t well deployed. The article mentions two specific problems that appear to plague DNSSEC implementations.
First, on the server side, a number of Continue reading
Internet-wide identity management is one of the hot issues currently — dealing with hundreds of separate usernames and passwords is insecure and unfriendly for users. Increasingly, people use their social network accounts to log into websites, which works well, but forces you to allow either Google or Facebook to track all your logins — you don’t have a lot of choice. —Vittorio Bertola @APNIC