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Category Archives for "Russ White"

Research; HTTPS Interceptions

I have written elsewhere about the problems with the “little green lock” shown by browsers to indicate a web page (or site) is secure. In that article, I considered the problem of freely available certificates, and a hole in the way browsers load pages. In March of 2017, another paper was published documenting another problem with the “green lock” paradigm—the impact of HTTPS interception. In theory, a successful HTTPS session means the session between host and the server has been encrypted, which means no third party can read the contents of the packets passing between the two.

This works, modulo the trustworthiness of the certificates involved in encrypting the traffic, so long as there is no-one in the middle of the connection encrypting packets from the receiver, and re-encrypting them towards the transmitter. This “man in the middle,” or MITM, can read the contents of all the packets in the exchange, even though the data is encrypted on transmit. Surely such MITM situations are rare, right?

Right.

The researchers in this paper set out to discover just how often HTTPS (LTS) sessions are terminated and re-encrypted by some device or piece of software in the middle. To discover how often Continue reading

Research: Even Password Complexity is a Tradeoff

Stronger passwords are always better—at least this is the working theory of most folks in information technology, security or otherwise. Such blanket rules should raise your suspicions, however; the rule11 maxim if you haven’t found the tradeoff, you haven’t looked hard enough should apply to passwords, too.

Dinei Florêncio, Cormac Herley, and Paul C. Van Oorschot. 2016. Pushing on string: the ‘don’t care’ region of password strength. Commun. ACM 59, 11 (October 2016), 66-74. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2934663

Begin with this simple assertion: complex passwords are primarily a guard against password guessing attacks. Further, while the loss of a single account can be tragic for the individual user (and in some systems, the loss of a single password can have massive consequences!), for the system operator, it is the overall health of the system that matters. There is, in any system, a point at which enough accounts have been compromised that the system itself can no longer secure any information. This not only means the system can no longer hide information, it also means transactions within the system can no longer be trusted.

The number of compromised accounts varies based on the kind of system in view; effectively breaching Continue reading

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