Use Protection if Peering Promiscuously

Last week, I wrote a blog post discussing the dangers of BGP routing leaks between peers, illustrating the problem using examples of recent snafus between China Telecom and Russia’s Vimpelcom. This follow-up blog post provides three additional examples of misbehaving peers and further demonstrates the impact unmonitored routes can have on Internet performance and security. Without monitoring, you are essentially trusting everyone on the Internet to route your traffic appropriately.
In the first two cases, an ISP globally announced routes from one of its peers, effectively inserting itself into the path of the peer’s international communications (i.e., becoming a transit provider rather than remaining a peer) for days on end. The third example looks back at the China Telecom routing leak of April 2010 to see how a US academic backbone network prioritized bogus routes from one of its peers, China Telecom, to (briefly) redirect traffic from many US universities through China.
Recap: How this works
To recap the explanation from the previous blog (and to reuse the neat animations our graphics folks made), we first note that ISPs form settlement-free direct connections (peering) in order to save on the cost of sending Continue reading

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