Thwarting BGP Route Hijacking with SDN as a Catalyst
Thwarting BGP Route Hijacking with SDN as a Catalyst
by Cengiz Alaettinoglu, CTO - August 12, 2014
Following up on my last post about the security vulnerabilities in BGP, the IETF has taken two efforts to fix them. Back in 1995, the Routing Policy System Working Group was formed (I have chaired this working group, and many in the community, including folks from service providers and address registry operators, contributed). We have standardized a language called Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL[ref]), and a security model (RP-SEC [ref]).
Network operators, both service providers and enterprises, would register their authorized routes (by chain of trust starting from the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority), and the neighbor ASs they pass these routes to. Given the state of the art in 1994, the security credentials (authentication as well as authorization) would be checked at the time of registration. We then wrote a tool that read these validated policy specifications and generated router configurations that would be immune to these kinds of attacks. Unfortunately, RPSL adoption has been low (more on this later).
IETF recently took another effort in its Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group (SIDR). The technology developed there can check the security credentials in-band Continue reading

