Author Archives: Threat Analysis Unit
Author Archives: Threat Analysis Unit
Contributors: Giovanni Vigna, Oleg Boyarchuk, Stefano Ortolani
The continued assault on Ukraine will go down in history as the first one that was truly carried out both kinetically on the battlefield and virtually using cyberattacks against the computer infrastructure of the invaded nation.
As the invasion started and escalated, new malware threats were introduced by malicious actors to harm Ukrainian organizations. Early in the assault, security researchers have observed the emergence of new threats that appears to be developed ad hoc to be key tools in cyber-war efforts.
In addition to well-known attacks and threats, such as network DDoS and ransomware, these threats included “wipers,” whose sole purpose is the disabling of the targeted hosts, often combined with other tools that allow the attackers to infect the largest number of hosts possible.
While these attacks targeted specific organizations, there is a substantial risk that in the highly connected, distributed environments used to exchange and share information in multi-national organizations these attacks might spill beyond their intended targets.
It is therefore of paramount importance to understand these threats in order to help protect both Ukrainian organizations and the rest of the world. To this end, CISA has published a series Continue reading
Emotet attacks leveraging malicious macros embedded in Excel files continue, with new variants and novel tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Following our recent report, we observed new waves of Emotet campaigns abusing legitimate Windows features, such as batch scripts and the mshta utility, combined with PowerShell, to deliver Emotet payloads.
In this follow-up blog post, we first provide an overview of the delivery processes of Emotet payloads in typical attacks. Then, we examine the recent variants and reveal how techniques evolved in these attacks.
The Emotet infection chain typically starts with a spam email containing a malicious document in the attachment (see Figure 1). The attachment can be either a Word document or an Excel file with embedded VBA or Excel 4.0 (XL4) macros. To entice the user to enable macro execution in Microsoft Word or Excel, the file displays social engineering content when opened. Once macro execution has been enabled, the embedded macro is executed, leading to the delivery process of an Emotet payload.
As highlighted in Figure 1, there are typically two ways to deliver an Emotet payload:
The state of cyber security is a typical example of a cat-and-mouse game between hackers and defenders. Sometimes, a threat that appears to be under control, if not completely mitigated, comes back with a vengeance. This is exactly what happened to Emotet.
It has been just about a year since the Emotet botnet was taken down, thanks to the international efforts of multiple law enforcement agencies. But the silence from Emotet attackers did not last long. Late last year, we saw a report on the resurface of Emotet distributed by Trickbot. Recently VMware’s Threat Analysis Unit saw another Emotet campaign—where the attacks leveraged the increasingly abused Excel 4.0 (XL4) macros to spread Emotet payloads.
In this blog post, we investigate the first stage of the recent Emotet attacks by analyzing one of the samples from the recent campaign and reveal novel tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that were not used by Emotet in the past.
Figure 1 shows the detection timeline of a recent Emotet campaign that affected some of our customers—mostly in the EMEA region. The campaign started on January 11 and peaked the next day before fading Continue reading
As targeting data centers, which mainly run workloads on Linux, has proven to be a very lucrative target for cyber criminals, Linux malware has become increasingly prevalent. Although still an emerging threat that’s somewhat less complex than its Windows counterpart, analysis of Linux malware remains challenging due to lack of analysis tools in the Linux world.
Luckily, both the Linux kernel and the Linux ecosystem provide a set of capabilities and tools that, when combined, potentially allow for the creation of malware analysis frameworks as powerful as those available on Windows.
This blog details what can be achieved by leveraging tools and an analysis pipeline specifically tailored for Linux, and introduces our Distributed Analysis for Research and Threat Hunting
(DARTH) framework. We provide a high-level overview of the framework, including core components and modules, as well as the design requirements that have led our research efforts in this area. We then discuss Tracer, a dynamic analysis module used in DARTH to collect various behaviors during malware execution in a controlled environment.
As part of our research, we often find ourselves running new types of analysis on large collections of malicious samples; building a scalable Continue reading
Supply-chain attacks can be so destructive that they are often considered black-swan events. Often, the most upsetting aspect of the attack is that it manages to compromise what is normally deemed to be safe by definition — whether that’s a software component or an MSP (managed service provider). The result is that our understanding of perimeters, security boundaries, and/or best practices is often flipped upside down.
Consider, for example, the SolarWinds attack back in December 2020: disguised as a normal software update, attackers managed to implant a pre-crafted backdoor on thousands of customers, which led many frantic security teams to discover that their network perimeter had already been breached several months before. Another (and even more destructive) attack took place in July 2021: by exploiting a vulnerability in Kaseya VSA servers, attackers managed to infect hundreds of MSPs, which in turn deployed the REvil ransomware to thousands of customers, breaking the assumption of a safe boundary between different IT infrastructures.
Fast forward to October 2021. An innocent bug report alerted the entire NPM developer community that a core open-source library had been hacked. Fortunately, the community quickly handled and fixed the issue. But, had it not been detected, the potential Continue reading
Contributors: Jason Zhang, Stefano Ortolani, Giovanni Vigna
Cyber security threats have been growing significantly in both volume and sophistication over the past decade with no sign of a slowdown. Naturally, this has also been accompanied by an increased collection of threat telemetry data, ranging from detonation timelines to IDS/IPS detections. Telemetry data, typically represented by enriched time series, often contains underlying peak signals which in turn correspond to a few informative events: occurrences of malware campaigns, heavily used malware delivery vectors, commonly affected verticals, and even anomalies possibly revealing the presence of false positives. While all this information clearly holds tremendous value, mining these data sets can be expensive and complex. As a result, organizations often find it challenging to gain further insights of the underlying threat landscape even though they have access to the data.
Recently at VirusBulletin Threat Intelligence Practitioners’ Summit (TIPs) 2021, we presented our latest research aiming to tackle the challenges discussed above: Telemetry Peak Analyzer is a statistical approach to detect malware campaigns as they happen by relying on telemetry data in an efficient and scalable manner.
Read on to get the key insights of the presentation. We’ll provide an overview of the characteristics Continue reading
Office macros are a popular attack vector to compromise a user’s environment and deploy additional components. That’s because macros can hide within documents, often under several layers of obfuscation. In recent years, there has been an increase in attacks that leverage Excel 4.0 macros as threat actors have realized the power that this legacy functionality provides to an attacker.
Analyzing Excel 4.0 macros can be a daunting task, because the analysis often requires manual, step-by-step execution of the code to extract behaviors and IoCs such as the URLs from which additional malware components will be downloaded.
In this blog, we present Symbexcel, a novel solution based on symbolic execution for the automated de-obfuscation and analysis of Excel 4.0 macros. Our approach was recently presented at BlackHat 2021 .
Excel 4.0 macros, or XLM macros, are a 30-year-old feature of Microsoft Excel that allows one to encode a series of operations into the contents of spreadsheet cells. Distinct from the traditional functions provided by an Excel spreadsheet (such as SUM), Excel 4.0 macro functions have access to the Windows API and can be used to interact with the underlying operating Continue reading
Contributors: Jason Zhang (NSBU TAU), Stefano Ortolani (NSBU TAU)
Formerly known as the Malware Information Sharing Platform, MISP is a leading open-source threat intelligence platform (TIP) that organizations of all sizes can leverage to store, share, and enrich threat indicators of compromise (IoCs).
The MISP ecosystem primarily comprises two parts: MISP core (or engine) and MISP modules. MISP core is responsible for the main functionality of the platform, while MISP modules were introduced to extend the capability of MISP without changing MISP core components.
Thanks to the simple API interface provided by MISP, many third-party MISP modules have been developed to greatly extend MISP’s capabilities. There are mainly three types of MISP modules: expansion modules, import modules, and export modules. More details on MISP modules can be found on MISP’s GitHub MISP module repository, which includes three modules developed by Lastline (now part of VMware) that integrate MISP with VMware NSX Advanced Threat Analyzer (ATA), as we reported earlier.
Recently VMware’s Threat Analysis Unit (TAU) developed a new expansion module, which replaces the three Lastline modules. The improvements from the new module are twofold: a simplified enrichment process and an augmented enrichment capability.
In this blog post, Continue reading
In the past few months, we have witnessed several indiscriminate attacks targeting big companies. Whereas years ago different threat actors focused on specific sectors, nowadays the same techniques, tactics, and procedures (e.g., how the perimeter is penetrated, which tools are used for lateral movement) are consistently applied regardless of company size, location, or industry. Target selection is much more dependent on an organization’s IT infrastructure: for example, recent trends show several actors (among them REvil, HelloKitty, or what was known as Darkside) increasingly targeting companies running workloads on VMware ESXi by adding to their ransomware capabilities to gracefully stop virtual machines before encrypting them (see Figure 1).
Another important trend we have seen growing in the last few months is the use of ransomware to seize sensitive customer data — first by exfiltrating it, then encrypting it, and later pressuring the victim into paying a ransom under the threat of disclosing such data publicly (a technique called “double extortion”). Notable victims include CD Projekt RED, which faced the leak of the source code of some of its most famous video games.
While many threat reports have already dissected the technical Continue reading
Cobalt Strike  is a tool to support red teams in attack simulation exercises. To this end, Cobalt Strike provides several techniques that allow a red team to execute targeted attacks to compromise a target network, established a bridge head on a host, and then move laterally to gain additional access to computers, accounts, and, eventually, data.
While the goal of Raphael Mudge, the author of Cobalt Strike, was to provide a framework to test network defenses to support the development of effective detection mechanisms and incident response procedures, the power provided by the tools was not lost on malicious actors (see, for example, ).
Soon, Cobalt Strike was copied, modified, and included in the toolset used in attacks against targets of all kinds. For example, recently Cobalt Strike was used as part of both the SolarWinds supply-chain attack  and the ransomware attacks against Colonial Pipeline . The tool is so popular that there are Telegram channels and GitHub repositories dedicated to obtaining or producing modified, pirated copies of the Cobalt Strike software .
Given its “dual nature” and wide adoption by both sides of the security battlefield, it is not surprising that security teams struggle to develop Continue reading
MISP (originally Malware Information Sharing Platform) is a platform to share, store, and correlate Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from targeted attacks, threat intelligence, or even financial fraud information. One of the reasons underlying MISP’s success is its extensibility via third-party modules. However, as the number of contributors increases, coordination and distribution can quickly become a challenge. To solve this issue, MISP’s authors created a satellite project called MISP modules.
Before joining the NSX family, we at Lastline contributed three different modules to the MISP project in order to better integrate MISP with the sandbox that is now part of the NSX Advanced Threat Analyzer (ATA) product offering. The main idea was to enrich the file indicators referencing an artifact with behavioral information extracted by detonating the artifact in the sandbox, or by retrieving the analysis result of previous detonations. We accomplished this by relying on three different modules:
NSX-T has revolutionized the data center and plays a key role in modern data center fabrics. Its unmatched capabilities are key elements in any effort to modernize networking in the data center.
NSX-T version 3.1.1 will go down as a critical milestone in this journey, as it supports OSPF version 2.
Based on RFC 2328, Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPF v2) provides fast convergence, scalability, and is widely known among network architects and their operations teams. As a result, it is one of the most popular link state routing protocols in enterprise networks and data centers.
Interconnecting your physical networking fabric with NSX-T was possible using static routes and BGP. OSPF is now an option to consider leveraging dynamic routing protocols in the data center. By supporting OSPF as a dynamic routing protocol, existing NSX for vSphere customers can migrate seamlessly to NSX-T.
In this blogpost, we will demonstrate how to implement OSPFv2 within NSX-T in your data center.
Providing connectivity between users and applications in a data center is crucial. The main purpose of any routing protocol is to dynamically exchange or share information regarding the reachability of a network.
Contributors: Subrat Sarkar (T-Rex), Jason Zhang (NSBU TAU)
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) that is known for stealing credentials from several applications, including web browsers, VPN clients, and mail and FTP applications. It also supports keylogging, screen grabbing, and other functionality. Since it first came on to the scene in 2014, Agent Tesla has evolved into a fully customizable commercial malware tool, which is readily available on underground markets. Given the huge popularity of the malware, this threat has been thoroughly covered by the threat intelligence community, including our analysis in 2018 , our reports on COVID-19 related cyber threats  , and a recent article describing a surge of infections . More recently, we detected a new wave of Agent Tesla attacks that exhibited some interesting characteristics, such as requesting a connection to top European football club websites.
In this blog post, we first present some of VMware’s NSX Advanced Threat Prevention telemetry and email metadata from the attack. We then provide our analysis detailing the most distinctive aspects of the attack, from the use of well-known European football club websites to key tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Figure 1 shows Continue reading
Data centers are an appealing target for cybercriminals. Even though they may be more difficult to compromise than the home computer of a kid playing Fortnite or the laptop of a sales representative connecting to a random wireless network, they can bring very large rewards: databases with millions of records containing financial and personal information, substantial computational resources that can be used to mine cryptocurrencies, and access to key assets that can be held for ransom.
In this blog post, we analyze the main pathways that cybercriminals leverage to gain access to data centers, how they take advantage of that access, and what security administrators can do to reduce and manage the associated risks.
The obvious first goal of an attacker is to gain access to the targeted data center. This can be achieved in several ways — including social engineering , physical access , and occasionally by deer — but anecdotal evidence suggests that the two main avenues are remote exploitation (also known as remote-to-local attacks ), and stolen credentials .
In a remote-to-local attack, an attacker targets a remotely accessible service provided by one of the workloads running in the data Continue reading
Dridex is a banking Trojan. After almost a decade since it was first discovered, the threat is still active. According to a report published by Check Point , Dridex was one of the most prevalent malware in 2020. The recent Dridex campaign detected by VMware demonstrates that this ongoing threat constantly evolves with new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which exhibit great differences with respect to the variants we’ve collected from campaigns since April 2020 (as discussed in the section Comparison with old Dridex samples).
In this blog post, we first examine the recent Dridex attack by looking into some of VMware’s NSX Advanced Threat Prevention telemetry, which showcases the magnitude of the campaign. We then present the analysis for the most distinctive aspects of the attack, from the techniques leveraged by the XLSM downloader to the main functionality of the DLL payloads. Finally, we provide a comparison to some other Dridex variants seen in the past, which leads to the conclusion that the Dridex variant from the January 2021 campaign is very different from previous variants.
The chart below shows Continue reading
Memory analysis plays a key role in identifying sophisticated malware in both user space and kernel space, as modern threats are often file-less, operating without creating a file system artifact.
The most effective approach to the detection of these sophisticated malware components is to install on the protected operating system an agent that continuously monitors the OS memory for signs of compromise. However, this approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the agent introduces a constant overhead in the monitored OS — caused by both the resources used by the agent process (e.g., CPU, memory) and the instrumentation used to capture relevant events (e.g., API hooking). Second, a malware sample can detect the presence of an agent and attempt to either disable the agent or evade detection. Third, depending on how it is deployed, the agent not have access to specific portions of the user-space and kernel-space memory, and, as a consequence, may miss important evidence of a compromise. Finally, deploying, maintaining, and updating agents on every endpoint can be challenging, especially in heterogeneous deployments where multiple versions of different operating systems and architectures coexist.
A complementary approach to the detection of Continue reading