Alex Forster

Author Archives: Alex Forster

How we built Network Analytics v2

How we built Network Analytics v2
How we built Network Analytics v2

Network Analytics v2 is a fundamental redesign of the backend systems that provide real-time visibility into network layer traffic patterns for Magic Transit and Spectrum customers. In this blog post, we'll dive into the technical details behind this redesign and discuss some of the more interesting aspects of the new system.

To protect Cloudflare and our customers against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, we operate a sophisticated in-house DDoS detection and mitigation system called dosd. It takes samples of incoming packets, analyzes them for attacks, and then deploys mitigation rules to our global network which drop any packets matching specific attack fingerprints. For example, a simple network layer mitigation rule might say “drop UDP/53 packets containing responses to DNS ANY queries”.

In order to give our Magic Transit and Spectrum customers insight into the mitigation rules that we apply to their traffic, we introduced a new reporting system called "Network Analytics" back in 2020. Network Analytics is a data pipeline that analyzes raw packet samples from the Cloudflare global network. At a high level, the analysis process involves trying to match each packet sample against the list of mitigation rules that dosd has deployed, so that it can Continue reading

SLP: a new DDoS amplification vector in the wild

SLP: a new DDoS amplification vector in the wild
SLP: a new DDoS amplification vector in the wild

Earlier today, April 25, 2023, researchers Pedro Umbelino at Bitsight and Marco Lux at Curesec published their discovery of CVE-2023-29552, a new DDoS reflection/amplification attack vector leveraging the SLP protocol. If you are a Cloudflare customer, your services are already protected from this new attack vector.

Service Location Protocol (SLP) is a “service discovery” protocol invented by Sun Microsystems in 1997. Like other service discovery protocols, it was designed to allow devices in a local area network to interact without prior knowledge of each other. SLP is a relatively obsolete protocol and has mostly been supplanted by more modern alternatives like UPnP, mDNS/Zeroconf, and WS-Discovery. Nevertheless, many commercial products still offer support for SLP.

Since SLP has no method for authentication, it should never be exposed to the public Internet. However, Umbelino and Lux have discovered that upwards of 35,000 Internet endpoints have their devices’ SLP service exposed and accessible to anyone. Additionally, they have discovered that the UDP version of this protocol has an amplification factor of up to 2,200x, which is the third largest discovered to-date.

Cloudflare expects the prevalence of SLP-based DDoS attacks to rise significantly in the coming weeks as malicious actors learn how to exploit Continue reading

PIPEFAIL: How a missing shell option slowed Cloudflare down

PIPEFAIL: How a missing shell option slowed Cloudflare down
PIPEFAIL: How a missing shell option slowed Cloudflare down

At Cloudflare, we’re used to being the fastest in the world. However, for approximately 30 minutes last December, Cloudflare was slow. Between 20:10 and 20:40 UTC on December 16, web requests served by Cloudflare were artificially delayed by up to five seconds before being processed. This post tells the story of how a missing shell option called “pipefail” slowed Cloudflare down.

Background

Before we can tell this story, we need to introduce you to some of its characters.

PIPEFAIL: How a missing shell option slowed Cloudflare down

Cloudflare’s Front Line protects millions of users from some of the largest attacks ever recorded. This protection is orchestrated by a sidecar service called dosd, which analyzes traffic and looks for attacks. When dosd detects an attack, it provides Front Line with a list of attack fingerprints that describe how Front Line can match and block the attack traffic.

Instances of dosd run on every Cloudflare server, and they communicate with each other using a peer-to-peer mesh to identify malicious traffic patterns. This decentralized design allows dosd to perform analysis with much higher fidelity than is possible with a centralized system, but its scale also imposes some strict performance requirements. To meet these requirements, we need to provide dosd with very Continue reading

CVE-2022-26143: TP240PhoneHome reflection/amplification DDoS attack vector

CVE-2022-26143: TP240PhoneHome reflection/amplification DDoS attack vector

Beginning in mid-February 2022, security researchers, network operators, and security vendors observed a spike in DDoS attacks sourced from UDP port 10074 targeting broadband access ISPs, financial institutions, logistics companies, and organizations in other vertical markets.

Upon further investigation, it was determined that the devices abused to launch these attacks are MiCollab and MiVoice Business Express collaboration systems produced by Mitel, which incorporate TP-240 VoIP- processing interface cards and supporting software; their primary function is to provide Internet-based site-to-site voice connectivity for PBX systems.

Approximately 2600 of these systems have been incorrectly provisioned so that an unauthenticated system test facility has been inadvertently exposed to the public Internet, allowing attackers to leverage these PBX VoIP gateways as DDoS reflectors/amplifiers.

Mitel is aware that these systems are being abused to facilitate high-pps (packets-per-second) DDoS attacks, and have been actively working with customers to remediate abusable devices with patched software that disables public access to the system test facility.

In this blog, we will further explore the observed activity, explain how the driver has been abused, and share recommended mitigation steps. This research was created cooperatively among a team of researchers from Akamai SIRT, Cloudflare, Lumen Black Lotus Labs, NETSCOUT ASERT, Continue reading