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Category Archives for "Security"

Mythology about security…

Ed Felton tweeted a few days ago: “Often hear that the reason today’s Internet is not more secure is that the early designers failed to imagine that security could ever matter. That is a myth.”

This is indeed a myth.  Much of the current morass can be laid at the feet of the United States government, due to its export regulations around cryptography.

I will testify against the myth.  Bob Scheifler and I started the X Window System in 1984 at MIT, which is a network transparent window system: that is, applications can reside on computers anywhere in the network and use the X display server. As keyboard events may be transmitted over the network, it was clear to us from the get-go that it was a security issue. It is in use to this day on Linux systems all over the world (remote X11 access is no longer allowed: the ssh protocol is used to tunnel the X protocol securely for remote use). By sometime in 1985 or 1986 we were distributing X under the MIT License, which was developed originally for use of the MIT X Window System distribution (I’d have to go dig Continue reading

Container Security through Segregation

One of my readers sent me a container security question after reading the Application Container Security Guide from NIST:

We are considering segregating dev/test/prod environments with bare-metal hardware. I did not find something in the standard concerning this. What should a financial institution do in your opinion?

I am no security expert and know just enough about containers to be dangerous, but there’s a rule that usually works well: use common sense and identify similar scenarios that have already been solved.

Read more ...

New RFC 8360 – RPKI Validation Reconsidered – Offers Alternative Validation Procedures to Improve Routing Security

RFC 8360, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered, is now published in the RFC libraries.

What is RPKI?

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) aims to improve the security of the Internet routing system, specifically the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), by establishing a hierarchy of trust for BGP routes. Today, most organizations simply trust that routing updates they get are sent by authorized senders. This is how bad actors and misconfigurations can cause massive routing issues. With RPKI, the receiving organization can verify that the sending organization is authorized to send the routing update.

RPKI works by issuing X.509-based resource certificates to holders of IP addresses and AS numbers to prove assignment of these resources. These certificates are issued to Local Internet Registries (LIRs) by one of the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) who allocate and assign these resources in their service regions.

What Does This RFC Do?

In the IETF, participants have been discussing issues that may arise when resources move across registries. The problem happens when a subordinate certificate “over-claims” resources compared to its parent. According to the standard validation procedure specified in RFC 6487, the whole branch beneath would be invalidated. The closer to Continue reading

Argo Tunnel: A Private Link to the Public Internet

Argo Tunnel: A Private Link to the Public Internet

Argo Tunnel: A Private Link to the Public Internet
Photo from Wikimedia Commons

Today we’re introducing Argo Tunnel, a private connection between your web server and Cloudflare. Tunnel makes it so that only traffic that routes through Cloudflare can reach your server.

You can think of Argo Tunnel as a virtual P.O. box. It lets someone send you packets without knowing your real address. In other words, it’s a private link. Only Cloudflare can see the server and communicate with it, and for the rest of the internet, it’s unroutable, as if the server is not even there.

How this used to be done

This type of private deployment used to be accomplished with GRE tunnels. But GRE tunnels are expensive and slow, they don’t really make sense in a 2018 internet.

GRE is a tunneling protocol for sending data between two servers by simulating a physical link. Configuring a GRE tunnel requires coordination between network administrators from both sides of the connection. It is an expensive service that is usually only available for large corporations with dedicated budgets. The GRE protocol encapsulates packets inside other packets, which means that you will have to either lower the MTU of your origin servers, or have your router do Continue reading

Extend your security view from the data center to the edge

Extend your security view from the data center to the edge

How great would it be to have a dashboard with a holistic view of threats, malicious server activity, vulnerabilities, sensitive data access levels and a daily scan of resources across all of your applications and services? Now you can.

Cloudflare is thrilled to announce its integration with Cloud Security Command Center (Cloud SCC) for Google Cloud Platform: A security and data risk platform helping enterprises gather data, identify threats, and act on them before they result in business damage or loss.

The advantage of the Cloud SCC solution is that it surfaces insights from both the Google Cloud Platform, as well as Cloudflare’s edge, in a unified dashboard.

What Cloudflare data is visible within the Cloud SCC dashboard?

Through Cloudflare’s API endpoints, data is pushed to Google’s Cloud SCC dashboard and domain name information mapped to the appropriate Google Cloud asset. Cloudflare’s branded card in the Cloud SCC dashboard is automatically populated with a summary of top theat origins, top types of threats, and latest Web Application Firewall (WAF) events.

Extend your security view from the data center to the edge

To view a full list of Cloudflare events, click on the Cloudflare card in Cloud SCC and it will take you to a “Cloudflare Findings” page. From there, you can Continue reading

Why the crypto-backdoor side is morally corrupt

Crypto-backdoors for law enforcement is a reasonable position, but the side that argues for it adds things that are either outright lies or morally corrupt. Every year, the amount of digital evidence law enforcement has to solve crimes increases, yet they outrageously lie, claiming they are "going dark", losing access to evidence. A weirder claim is that  those who oppose crypto-backdoors are nonetheless ethically required to make them work. This is morally corrupt.

That's the point of this Lawfare post, which claims:
What I am saying is that those arguing that we should reject third-party access out of hand haven’t carried their research burden. ... There are two reasons why I think there hasn’t been enough research to establish the no-third-party access position. First, research in this area is “taboo” among security researchers. ... the second reason why I believe more research needs to be done: the fact that prominent non-government experts are publicly willing to try to build secure third-party-access solutions should make the information-security community question the consensus view. 
This is nonsense. It's like claiming we haven't cured the common cold because researchers haven't spent enough effort at it. When researchers claim they've tried 10,000 ways to make Continue reading

WannaCry after one year

In the news, Boeing (an aircraft maker) has been "targeted by a WannaCry virus attack". Phrased this way, it's implausible. There are no new attacks targeting people with WannaCry. There is either no WannaCry, or it's simply a continuation of the attack from a year ago.


It's possible what happened is that an anti-virus product called a new virus "WannaCry". Virus families are often related, and sometimes a distant relative gets called the same thing. I know this watching the way various anti-virus products label my own software, which isn't a virus, but which virus writers often include with their own stuff. The Lazarus group, which is believed to be responsible for WannaCry, have whole virus families like this. Thus, just because an AV product claims you are infected with WannaCry doesn't mean it's the same thing that everyone else is calling WannaCry.

Famously, WannaCry was the first virus/ransomware/worm that used the NSA ETERNALBLUE exploit. Other viruses have since added the exploit, and of course, hackers use it when attacking systems. It may be that a network intrusion detection system detected ETERNALBLUE, which people then assumed was due to WannaCry. It may actually have been an nPetya infection instead (nPetya Continue reading

Cloudflare is adding Drupal WAF Rule to Mitigate Critical Drupal Exploit

Drupal has recently announced an update to fix a critical remote code execution exploit (SA-CORE-2018-002/CVE-2018-7600). In response we have just pushed out a rule to block requests matching these exploit conditions for our Web Application Firewall (WAF). You can find this rule in the Cloudflare ruleset in your dashboard under the Drupal category with the rule ID of D0003.

Drupal Advisory: https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2018-002