Chambers says insects will be the protein of the future.
Security and management are considered two benefits of running containers inside of VMs.
Tell me if this sounds familiar: any connection from inside the corporate network is trusted and any connection from the outside is not. This is the security strategy used by most enterprises today. The problem is that once the firewall, or gateway, or VPN server creating this perimeter is breached, the attacker gets immediate, easy and trusted access to everything.
CC BY-SA 2.0 image by William Warby
There’s a second problem with the traditional security perimeter model. It either requires employees to be on the corporate network (i.e. physically in the office) or using a VPN, which slows down work because every page load makes extra round trips to the VPN server. After all this hassle, users on the VPN are still highly susceptible to phishing, man-in-the-middle and SQL injection attacks.
A few years ago, Google pioneered a solution for their own employees called BeyondCorp. Instead of keeping their internal applications on the intranet, they made them accessible on the internet. There became no concept of in or outside the network. The network wasn’t some fortified citadel, everything was on the internet, and no connections were trusted. Everyone had to prove they are who they say they are.
DNSSEC prevents attacks in which hackers trick the DNS system into storing false IP addresses.
AT&T has been aggressively transforming its core network with software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV), gaining the ability to offer on-site infrastructure to enterprises in an innovative, simplified, and easy to consume model. The resulting platform, AT&T FlexWareSM, provides best-in-class, virtualized network functions to businesses across the entire spectrum of the market. From... Read more →
In simple terms Meltdown and Spectre are simple vulnerabilities to understand. Imagine a gang of thieves waiting for a stage coach carrying a month’s worth of payroll.
There are two roads the coach could take, and a fork, or a branch, where the driver decides which one to take. The driver could take either one. What is the solution? Station robbers along both sides of the branch, and wait to see which one the driver chooses. When you know, pull the resources from one branch to the other, so you can effectively rob the stage. This is much the same as a modern processor handling a branch—the user could have put anything into some field, or retreived anything from a database, that might cause the software to run one of two sets of instructions. There is no way for the processor to know, so it runs both of them.
To run both sets of instructions, the processor will pull in the contents of specific memory locations, and begin exexuting code across these memory locations. Some of these memory locations might not be pieces of memory the currently running software is supposed to be able to access, but this is not Continue reading
The service includes cloud-based security information and event management.
Its product overlays application delivery and monitoring on SD-WANs from Cisco and Versa Networks.
The bill would prohibit the U.S. government from buying from the companies.
Fox-IT is recommending that IPv6 is disabled when it is not being used, as disabling Proxy Auto Detection. This of course means that Windows-based hosts are unable to switch preference to IPv6 when it is available (which all versions since Windows Vista will do), and that IPv6 would need to be explicitly re-enabled on hosts.
The article makes some important points, but IPv4 and IPv6 are fundamentally incompatible on a wire level and it needs to be understood they can’t communicate with each other except through translation devices. There are a number of known issues (including this one) with the security of automatic configuration mechanisms running on Local Area Networks, both under IPv6 and IPv4, but these require physical access to Continue reading
One of my readers sent me this question:
Do you have any thoughts on this meltdown HPTI thing? How does a hardware issue/feature become a software vulnerability? Hasn't there always been an appropriate level of separation between kernel and user space?
There’s always been privilege-level separation between kernel and user space, but not the address space separation - kernel has been permanently mapped into the high-end addresses of user space (but not visible from the user-space code on systems that had decent virtual memory management hardware) since the days of OS/360, CP/M and VAX/VMS (RSX-11M was an exception since it ran on 16-bit CPU architecture and its designers wanted to support programs up to 64K byte in size).
Read more ... We could see more ARM-based servers in virtualized networks.
The upgrade is targeted at 5G, cloud services, and data center interconnections.
The company is providing security patches.
Organizations that embark on the journey of building our virtual desktop environments, are taking traditionally external endpoints and bringing them into the data center. These endpoints are now closer and most times, reside on the same networking infrastructure as the backend application servers that they may access. These endpoints run Windows or even Linux desktop operating systems with multiple end-users that can access them. Malicious attacks that would traditionally take place outside the data center should an end-user find their desktop or laptop machine infected, could now take place on their virtual desktops inside the data center. With physical equipment, it’s easy to isolate the physical desktop or laptop and remediate the attack. Securing virtual desktop environments requires a different approach, but not one that’s unattainable. Securing an end user computing deployments is one of the primary security use cases for VMware NSX and can help provide a layered approach to securing virtual desktop workloads in the data center.
The NSX platform covers several business cases for securing an end user computing deployment. Each of these use cases, helps provide a multi-layered approach to ensure end user endpoints are as secure as possible in the Continue reading
As storage and security companies turn to software, they’ll need data centers to deploy the stacks.
While VMware NSX enables micro-segmentation of the Software Defined Data Center, it mostly polices traffic in layers 3 and 4, with only limited application level (layer 7) support. Sometimes additional layers of protection are needed for use cases such as Secure DMZ or meeting regulatory compliance requirements like PCI, in which case partner solutions can be added to the platform, with traffic steered into the supplemental solution prior to reaching the vSwitch (virtual wire). The resulting combination is high throughput due to the scale-out nature of NSX, but can also provide deep traffic analysis from the partner solution.
The usual enemy of deep traffic inspection in the data center is bandwidth. NSX addresses this issue, micro-segmentation security policy is zero trust – only traffic explicitly permitted out of a VM can pass, then steering policy to 3rd party solutions can be designed in order that bulk protocols such as storage and backup bypass them, leaving a more manageable amount of traffic for Check Point vSEC to provide IPS, anti-virus and anti-malware protection on, including Check Point’s Sandblast Zero-Day Protection against zero day attacks.
The connection between vSEC and NSX enables dynamic threat tagging, where traffic from an VM reaches Continue reading
The technology can detect malware in encrypted traffic without decryption.
The bugs could have allowed hackers to attack enterprise servers.
How was the state of the Internet’s routing system in 2017? Let’s take a look back using data from BGPStream. Some highlights:
An ‘incident’ is a suspicious change in the state of the routing system that can be attributed to an outage or a routing attack, like a route leak or hijack (either intentional or due to a configuration mistake).[i] Let’s look at just a few examples of incidents picked up by the media.
March 2017. SECW Telecom in Brazil hijacked prefixes of Cloudflare, Google, and BancoBrazil causing some outage for these services in the region.
April 2017. Large chunks of network traffic belonging to MasterCard, Visa, and more than two dozen other financial services companies were briefly routed through a Russian telecom. For several minutes, Rostelecom was originating 50 prefixes for numerous other Autonomous Systems, hijacking their traffic.
August 2017. Google accidentally leaked BGP prefixes it learned from peering relationships, essentially becoming a transit provider instead Continue reading