On today's Datanauts episode we're joined by Jason Edelman to dig into why the network has traditionally been so hard to automate, what tools are available, and how to get started.
The post Datanauts 034: Automate All The Packets appeared first on Packet Pushers.
On today's Datanauts episode we're joined by Jason Edelman to dig into why the network has traditionally been so hard to automate, what tools are available, and how to get started.
The post Datanauts 034: Automate All The Packets appeared first on Packet Pushers.
Vendors debut cloud-managed network management, Wave 2 access points, and more at this year's Interop.
Yesterday a new vulnerability has been announced in OpenSSL/LibreSSL. A padding oracle in CBC mode decryption, to be precise. Just like Lucky13. Actually, it’s in the code that fixes Lucky13.
It was found by Juraj Somorovsky using a tool he developed called TLS-Attacker. Like in the “old days”, it has no name except CVE-2016-2107. (I call it LuckyNegative201)
It’s a wonderful example of a padding oracle in constant time code, so we’ll dive deep into it. But first, two quick background paragraphs. If you already know all about Lucky13 and how it's mitigated in OpenSSL jump to "Off by 20" for the hot and new.
If, before reading, you want to check that your server is safe, you can do it with this one-click online test.
Very long story short, the CBC cipher suites in TLS have a design flaw: they first compute the HMAC of the plaintext, then encrypt plaintext || HMAC || padding || padding length
using CBC mode. The receiving end is then left with the uncomfortable task of decrypting the message and checking HMAC and padding without revealing the padding length in any way. If they do, we call Continue reading