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Category Archives for "Networking"

Worth Reading: ChatGPT Does Not Summarize

I mostly gave up on LLMs being any help (apart from generating copious amounts of bullshit), but I still thought that generating summaries might be an interesting use case. I was wrong.

As Gerben Wierda explains in his recent “When ChatGPT summarises, it actually does nothing of the kind” blog post, you have to understand a text if you want to generate a useful summary, and that’s not what LLMs do. They can generate a shorter version of the text, which might not focus on the significant bits.

Disrupting FlyingYeti’s campaign targeting Ukraine

Cloudforce One is publishing the results of our investigation and real-time effort to detect, deny, degrade, disrupt, and delay threat activity by the Russia-aligned threat actor FlyingYeti during their latest phishing campaign targeting Ukraine. At the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine introduced a moratorium on evictions and termination of utility services for unpaid debt. The moratorium ended in January 2024, resulting in significant debt liability and increased financial stress for Ukrainian citizens. The FlyingYeti campaign capitalized on anxiety over the potential loss of access to housing and utilities by enticing targets to open malicious files via debt-themed lures. If opened, the files would result in infection with the PowerShell malware known as COOKBOX, allowing FlyingYeti to support follow-on objectives, such as installation of additional payloads and control over the victim’s system.

Since April 26, 2024, Cloudforce One has taken measures to prevent FlyingYeti from launching their phishing campaign – a campaign involving the use of Cloudflare Workers and GitHub, as well as exploitation of the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831. Our countermeasures included internal actions, such as detections and code takedowns, as well as external collaboration with third parties to remove the actor’s cloud-hosted malware. Continue reading

Cloudflare acquires BastionZero to extend Zero Trust access to IT infrastructure

We’re excited to announce that BastionZero, a Zero Trust infrastructure access platform, has joined Cloudflare. This acquisition extends our Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) flows with native access management for infrastructure like servers, Kubernetes clusters, and databases.

Security teams often prioritize application and Internet access because these are the primary vectors through which users interact with corporate resources and external threats infiltrate networks. Applications are typically the most visible and accessible part of an organization's digital footprint, making them frequent targets for cyberattacks. Securing application access through methods like Single Sign-On (SSO) and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can yield immediate and tangible improvements in user security.

However, infrastructure access is equally critical and many teams still rely on castle-and-moat style network controls and local resource permissions to protect infrastructure like servers, databases, Kubernetes clusters, and more. This is difficult and fraught with risk because the security controls are fragmented across hundreds or thousands of targets. Bad actors are increasingly focusing on targeting infrastructure resources as a way to take down huge swaths of applications at once or steal sensitive data. We are excited to extend Cloudflare One’s Zero Trust Network Access to natively protect infrastructure with user- and device-based policies Continue reading

BGP Labs: Graceful Shutdown

Using the typical default router configurations, it can take minutes between a failure of an inter-AS link and the convergence of BGP routes. You can fine-tune that behavior with BGP timers and BFD (and still get pwned by Graceful Restart). While you can’t influence link failures, you could drain the traffic from a link before starting maintenance operations on it, and it would be a shame not to do that considering there’s a standard way to do that – the GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN BGP community defined in RFC 8326. That’s what you’ll practice in the next BGP lab exercise.

BGP Labs: Graceful Shutdown

Using the typical default router configurations, it can take minutes between a failure of an inter-AS link and the convergence of BGP routes. You can fine-tune that behavior with BGP timers and BFD (and still get pwned by Graceful Restart). While you can’t influence link failures, you could drain the traffic from a link before starting maintenance operations on it, and it would be a shame not to do that considering there’s a standard way to do that – the GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN BGP community defined in RFC 8326. That’s what you’ll practice in the next BGP lab exercise.

The New Era of AI Centers

In 1984, Sun was famous for declaring, “The Network is the Computer.” Forty years later we are seeing this cycle come true again with the advent of AI. The collective nature of AI training models relies on a lossless, highly-available network to seamlessly connect every GPU in the cluster to one another and enable peak performance. Networks also connect trained AI models to end users and other systems in the data center such as storage, allowing the system to become more than the sum of its parts. As a result, data centers are evolving into new AI Centers where the networks become the epicenter of AI management.

Container Security: Protect your data with Calico Egress Access Controls

23andMe is a popular genetics testing company, which was valued at $6B in 2021. Unfortunately, there was a massive data breach in December 2023, which caused a steep decline in the company’s value and trust, plummeting the company to a penny stock. While this breach was not directly related to Kubernetes, the same risks apply to containers running in your Kubernetes environments. If your containerized applications do not have the right egress access controls defined, chances of data exfiltration are much higher.

The basics

A typical modus operandi for threat actors is to look for vulnerabilities or misconfiguration in the environment and workloads, install malicious pods through privilege escalation techniques, and then exploit this unsecured pod to exfiltrate data.

Fig 1: Anatomy of a data exfiltration attack
Fig 1: Anatomy of a data exfiltration attack

An easy reconnaissance technique by just scanning the cluster network for public-facing workloads will be a first starting point for most attackers. Privilege escalation occurs mostly due to inconsistent or incorrect RBAC policies in Kubernetes through which unauthorized users can gain root privileges. Vulnerabilities in container images as part of the supply chain are also another attack path. All of these techniques will ultimately land on an exposed pod with a remote code Continue reading

Heavy Strategy: Failure and Resilience

Welcome to a crossover episode with the Heavy Strategy podcast! Firing the wrong person, mistakenly rebooting core switches in a massive network, not passing the CCIE exam– today we talk all about failure. For this conversation, we’re joined by fellow Packet Pushers Kyler Middleton and Ned Bellavance, hosts of the Day Two Cloud podcast. We... Read more »

HS073: Failure and Resilience

Firing the wrong person, mistakenly rebooting core switches in a massive network, not passing the CCIE exam– today we talk all about failure. For this conversation, we’re joined by fellow Packet Pushers Kyler Middleton and Ned Bellavance, hosts of the Day Two Cloud podcast. We swap stories, discuss response and prevention, and talk about accountability,... Read more »

BGP Route Reflectors Considered Harmful

The recent IBGP Full Mesh Between EVPN Leaf Switches blog post generated an interesting discussion on LinkedIn focused on whether we need route reflectors (in small fabrics) and whether they do more harm than good. Here are some of the highlights of that discussion, together with a running commentary.

Please note that we’re talking about BGP route reflectors in reasonably small data center fabrics. Large service provider networks with millions of customer VPN routes are a completely different story. As always, what you read in a random blog post might not apply to your network design. YMMV.