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Category Archives for "Security"

Why we are upset with the NYTimes Paris terrorist article

On the Twitters, we've been mocking that NYTimes article on the Paris terrorists and how they used "encryption". I thought I'd write up a brief note as to why.

It's a typical example of yellow journalism. The public isn't familiar with "encryption", so it's easy to sensationalize it, to make it seem like something sinister is going on.

At one point, the article says:
According to the police report and interviews with officials, none of the attackers’ emails or other electronic communications have been found, prompting the authorities to conclude that the group used encryption. What kind of encryption remains unknown, and is among the details that Mr. Abdeslam’s capture could help reveal.
That's not how encryption works. Instead, if "encryption" were the one thing the terrorists were using to hide, then you'd certainly find encrypted emails and encrypted messages -- ones you couldn't read without knowing the key.

The lack of emails/messages instead hints that the terrorists were meeting in person, passing paper notes to each other, or using telepathy. All of these, even telepathy, are more likely explanation for the lack of evidence than "encryption".

This article cites anonymous "authorities" here as concluding encryption was used. The New Continue reading

Technology Short Take #63

Welcome to Technology Short Take #63. I’ve managed to (mostly) get back to my Friday publishing schedule, though I’m running much later in the day this time around than usual. I’ll try to correct that for the next one. In any case, here’s another collection of links and articles from around the Net on the major data center technology areas. Have fun reading!

Networking

  • At DevOps Networking Forum 2016, I had the opportunity to share a presentation on some Linux networking options. If you’d like to see the presentation, it’s available on Slideshare and Speakerdeck. If you’d like to re-create the demo environment, check out the presentation’s GitHub repository. I’m also thinking of creating a video version of the presentation with some expanded content; I’d love to hear from readers if they would find that useful.
  • Here’s another topic that came up at the recent DevOps Networking Forum: Spotify’s SDN Internet Router (SIR). Here’s a two-part series (Part 1 and Part 2) that discusses the SIR, the motivations for building it, the challenges they faced in building SIR, and the solutions to those challenges. It’s a pretty interesting read, in my opinion.
  • I recently came across a couple Continue reading

Securing Access to and from your Jump Box and VDI with VMware NSX

Companies have struggled for years on how to allow third parties access to specific systems Cyber-Security-King_Blogthat they manage or support? These systems and access requirements range from HVAC and phones systems to full IT outsourcing or development.

The problem has always been twofold; one, how to provide secure access into the datacenter, and two, how do you secure the third party access to only the systems they require access to. Basically, how do you limit the hop to hop once they are inside your datacenter.

In the paper, I show you how leveraging VMware’s NSX and VMware Horizon products, you now have two different deployment modules that will allow you to control third party access and restrict that user’s inter-datacenter hopping abilities.

Here you will find the full paper: https://communities.vmware.com/docs/DOC-31415

Hadar

 

The post Securing Access to and from your Jump Box and VDI with VMware NSX appeared first on The Network Virtualization Blog.

Thoughts On Encryption

encryption

The debate on encryption has heated up significantly in the last couple of months. Most of the recent discussion has revolved around a particular device in a specific case but encryption is older than that. Modern encryption systems represent the culmination of centuries of development of making sure things aren’t seen.

Encryption As A Weapon

Did you know that twenty years ago the U.S. Government classified encryption as a munition? Data encryption was classified as a military asset and placed on the U.S. Munitions List as an auxiliary asset. The control of encryption as a military asset meant that exporting strong encryption to foreign countries was against the law. For a number of years the only thing that could be exported without fear of legal impact was regular old Data Encryption Standard (DES) methods. Even 3DES, which is theoretically much stronger but practically not much better than it’s older counterpart, was restricted for export to foreign countries.

While the rules around encryption export have been relaxed since the early 2000s, there are still some restrictions in place. Those rules are for countries that are on U.S. Government watch lists for terror states or governments deemed “rogue” states. Continue reading

Ukraine Emerges as Bogus Routing Source

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Last fall, the Interior Minister of Ukraine announced the creation of a national Cyberpolice (Кіберполіцію) to protect the country from everything from credit card fraud to malware.  Here’s something that would be great to add to their list: fraudulent BGP routing out of Ukraine.  Last year, we reported on an incident in which Ukrainian ISP Vega hijacked routes from British Telecom (including that of the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment), an event that could perhaps be chalked up to an innocent mistake.  However, the fraudulent routing we’re now seeing from Ukraine is deliberately designed to go unnoticed.  We’ll review some of this new behavior in this blog.

Governments take note

The profile of this issue has grown in the past year as governments have had to respond to their address space being fraudulently used.  Last July, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs (pictured right) was confronted with parliamentary questions concerning an incident where “attackers” had commandeered IP address space belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the previous year.  In that incident, on 18 November 2014, Decision Marketing (AS62228) out of Sofia, Bulgaria began globally announcing eleven BGP routes that did not belong to Continue reading

No, you backoff on backdoors or else

Speaking at #SXSW, President Obama threatened the tech community, telling us to backdoor our encryption ourselves or else congress will mandate a worse solution later.

No, Mr. President, it works the other way around. You'd better backoff on your encryption demands, or else the tech community will revolt, That's what's already happen with Apple's encryption efforts, as well as app developers like Signal and Wickr. Every time you turn the screws, we techies increase the encryption.

It's not a battle you can win without going full police-state. Sure, you can force Apple to backdoor its stuff, but then what about the encrypted apps? You'd have to lock them down as well. But what about encrypted apps developed in foreign countries? What about software I write myself? You aren't going to solve the "going dark" problem until you control all crypto.

If you succeed in achieving your nightmare Orwellian scenario, I promise you this: I'll emigrate to an extradition-free country, to continue the fight against the American government.

Your crypto backdoors creates a police-state beyond what even police-state advocates like Michael Hayden and Linsdey Graham can tolerate. Your point on "balance" is a lie. We've become radically unbalanced toward mass Continue reading

Can the Apple code be misused?

This post will respond to the tweet by Orin Kerr:

The government is right that the software must be signed by Apple and made to only work on Farook's phone, but the situation is more complicated than that.

The basic flaw in this picture is jailbreaks. This is a process of finding some hack that gets around Apple's "signing" security layer. Jailbreaks are popular in the user community, especially China, when people want to run software not approved by Apple. When the government says "intact security", it means "non-jailbroken".

Each new version of iOS requires the discovery of some new hack to enable jailbreaking. Hacking teams compete to see who can ship a new jailbreak to users, and other companies sell jailbreaks to intelligence agencies. Once jailbroken, the signing is bypassed, as is the second technique of locking the software specifically to Farook's phone.

Details are more complicated than this. Each jailbreak is different, and many won't allow this secret Apple software to be run. Some will. The point Continue reading

Code is expressive. Full Stop. (FBIvApple)

I write code. More than a $billion of products have been sold where my code is the key component. I've written more than a million lines of it. I point this out because I want to address this FBIvApple fight from the perspective of a coder -- from the perspective of somebody who the FBI proposes to conscript into building morally offensive code. Specifically, I want to address the First Amendment issue, whether code is expressive speech.


Consider Chris Valasek (@NudeHabasher), most recently famous for his car-hacking stunt of hacking into a Jeep from the Internet (along with Charlie Miller @CharlieMiller).

As Chris tells the story, he was on an airplane without WiFi writing code for his "CANbus-hack" tool that would hack the car. Without the Internet, he didn't have access to reference information, such as for strtok(). But he did remember from years earlier working on my (closed-source) code, and used the ideas he remembered to solve his immediate problem. No, he didn't remember the specifics of the code itself, and in any case, his CANbus-hack was unrelated to that code. Instead, it was the ideas expressed my code that he remembered.

What he came up with was this:



Continue reading

Captain America Civil War — it’s us

The next Marvel movie is Captain America: Winter Soldier. The plot is this: after the Avengers keep blowing things up, there is pushback demanding accountability. Government should be in control when to call in the Avengers, and superhumans should be forced to register with the government. Ironman is pro-accountability, as you've seen his story arc evolve toward this point in the movies. Captain America is anti-accountability.

This story arc is us, in cybersecurity. Last year, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek proved they could, through the "Internet", remotely control a car driving down the freeway. In the video, we see a frightened reporter as the engine stalls in freeway traffic. Should researchers be able to probe cars, medical equipment, and IoT devices accountable to nobody but themselves? Or should they be accountable to the public, and rules setup by government?

This story is about us personally, too. In cyberspace, many of us have superhuman powers. Should we be free to do whatever we want, without accountability, or should be be forced to register with teh government, so they can watch us? For example, I scan the Internet (the entire Internet) with relative impunity. This is what I tweeted when creating my Continue reading

RPKI ARIN Agreement Update

In December of 2014 I wrote an article about  a legal agreement that was discouraging network operators from implementing an important Internet security function.  I am happy to report, the situation has improved: ARIN no longer requires operators explicitly accept a click-through agreement in order to access the Trust Anchor Locator (TAL). Resource Public Key […]

The post RPKI ARIN Agreement Update appeared first on Packet Pushers.

RPKI ARIN Agreement Update

In December of 2014 I wrote an article about  a legal agreement that was discouraging network operators from implementing an important Internet security function.  I am happy to report, the situation has improved: ARIN no longer requires operators explicitly accept a click-through agreement in order to access the Trust Anchor Locator (TAL). Resource Public Key […]

The post RPKI ARIN Agreement Update appeared first on Packet Pushers.

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