On-going BGP Hijack Targets Palestinian ISP

It’s a new year, but some things never change. In the past few days we have observed a spate of incidents of routing misbehavior including two man-in-the-middle routing hijacks conducted in the past couple of days by A2B Internet out of the Netherlands.
Beginning at 00:33:44 UTC on Thursday, 8 January, we began observing a routing hijack of IP address space normally announced by Mada Telecom (AS51047), a Palestinian ISP with presence in both Gaza and the West Bank. Beginning at that time, A2B Internet B.V. (AS51088) began announcing 46.244.81.0/24, which is a more-specific route of 46.244.80.0/23, normally announced by Mada.

Traceroutes directed to this address space are presently being re-directed to A2B Internet’s network in the Netherlands before continuing on to Palestine. For example:
trace from Cyberjava, Malaysia to Mada Telecom, PS on Jan 09, 2015
1 *
2 x.x.x.x (Cyberjaya, Malaysia) 3.442
3 113.23.163.57 (Extreme Broadband, Malaysia) 0.696
4 113.23.190.109 (Extreme Broadband, Malaysia) 1.222
5 218.189.12.101 global.hgc.com.hk 35.854
6 218.189.8.102 global.hgc.com.hk 36.742
7 118.143.224.243 (Hutchison, Singapore) 41.628
8 218.189.8.142 (Hutchison, Amsterdam) 190.787
9 195.219.150.6 (Tata, Amsterdam, NL) 213.494
10 46.244.0.4 (A2B Internet, NL) 200.990
11 141.136.97.5 (GTT, Amsterdam) 268.366
12 4.68.70.97 xe-5-0-1.edge3.Amsterdam.Level3.net 300.909
13 4. Continue reading