Trojan.Eclipse — A Bad Moon Rising?
ASERT’s malware collection and processing system has automatic heuristics that bubble up potentially new and interesting DDoS malware samples into a “for human analysis” queue. A recent member of this queue was Trojan.Eclipse and this post is my analysis of the malware and its associated campaigns.
Analysis was performed on the sample with an MD5 of 0cdd10cd3393d3fe916a55b946c10ad6.
The name Eclipse comes from two places: a mutex named “eclipseddos” and a hardcoded Cookie value used in the command and control (C2) phone home. We’ll see in the Campaign section below that this threat is also known as: shadowbot, gbot3, eclipsebot, Rhubot, and Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qgxi.
Based on the C2 domain names, GeoIP of the C2 IP addresses, and a social media profile of the owner of one of the C2 domains, I suspect this malware to be Russian in origin. In addition, Eclipse is written in Delphi and empirically Russian malware coders have a certain fondness for this language.
Command and Control
The analyzed binary has a hardcoded C2 domain string. This string is protected from modification by running it through a simple hashing algorithm and comparing it against a hardcoded hash at certain points of the code. The Continue reading