Stumbled upon this paragraph on Russ White’s blog:
I don’t really know how you write a certification that does not allow someone who has memorized the feature guide to do well. How do you test for protocol theory, and still have a broad enough set of test questions that they cannot be photographed and distributed?
As Russ succinctly explained the problem is two-fold:
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Organized crime groups account for 50 percent of all the attacks analyzed, with nation-state or state-affiliated actors involved in 12 percent.
Dell EMC announced the results of a new IT Transformation maturity study surveying 4,000 IT decision makers worldwide Survey data shows transformed companies are 22x more likely to get new products and services to market ahead of the competition 81% of firms agree if they do not embrace IT Transformation, their companies will no longer... Read more →
Ed Felton tweeted a few days ago: “Often hear that the reason today’s Internet is not more secure is that the early designers failed to imagine that security could ever matter. That is a myth.”
This is indeed a myth. Much of the current morass can be laid at the feet of the United States government, due to its export regulations around cryptography.
I will testify against the myth. Bob Scheifler and I started the X Window System in 1984 at MIT, which is a network transparent window system: that is, applications can reside on computers anywhere in the network and use the X display server. As keyboard events may be transmitted over the network, it was clear to us from the get-go that it was a security issue. It is in use to this day on Linux systems all over the world (remote X11 access is no longer allowed: the ssh protocol is used to tunnel the X protocol securely for remote use). By sometime in 1985 or 1986 we were distributing X under the MIT License, which was developed originally for use of the MIT X Window System distribution (I’d have to go dig Continue reading
If you want to skip ahead to instructions, scroll to the next section. But I, like a TLS handshake, am very verbose so please enjoy this opener.
Imagine this scenario - I'm at a restaurant and need to have a private phone conversation but unfortunately my phone's battery is drained. To get around this problem, I borrow my friend's phone and dial the number - to protect my privacy I walk outside. When I'm done with the call, I come back inside and return the phone.
Whilst the phone itself doesn't store the coversation I've had, it does have a log of the recently dialed number, if the friend from whom I borrowed the phone wanted to, they could easily see who I actually called - even if they don't specifically know the topic of conversation.
Sometimes, the data about who you've spoken to can tell an aweful lot about the conversation - if someone was to call an emotional support hotline or a debt collector, you could probably infer a lot about the conversation from the caller ID.
When we browse the internet, we use encryption to try and protect the conversations we have. When you connect to a Continue reading
Nokia wins a 50-percent share of the multi-vendor deal with China Mobile. The two companies are also working together on software-defined networking for China Mobile to expand its cloud offering.
The trials will begin in New York City and Salt Lake City using mmWave spectrum, software-defined radios, edge cloud, and advanced optical networking.
The white paper helps companies meet industrial Internet of Things security goals and prioritize spending.
The South Korean operator plans to talk about 5G trials at the 5G New Horizon Symposium in Austin, Texas, next month.
Reading a paper to build a research post from (yes, I’ll write about the paper in question in a later post!) jogged my memory about an old case that perfectly illustrated the concept of a positive feedback loop leading to a failure. We describe positive feedback loops in Computer Networking Problems and Solutions, and in Navigating Network Complexity, but clear cut examples are hard to find in the wild. Feedback loops almost always contribute to, rather than independently cause, failures.
Many years ago, in a network far away, I was called into a case because EIGRP was failing to converge. The immediate cause was neighbor flaps, in turn caused by Stuck-In-Active (SIA) events. To resolve the situation, someone in the past had set the SIA timers really high, as in around 30 minutes or so. This is a really bad idea. The SIA timer, in EIGRP, is essentially the amount of time you are willing to allow your network to go unconverged in some specific corner cases before the protocol “does something about it.” An SIA event always represents a situation where “someone didn’t answer my query, which means I cannot stay within the state machine, so I Continue reading
Supercomputer makers have been on their exascale marks, and they have been getting ready, and now the US Department of Energy has just said “Go!”
The requests for proposal have been opened up for two more exascale systems, with a budget ranging from $800 million to $1.2 billion for a pair of machines to be installed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a possible sweetener of anywhere from $400 million to $600 million that, provided funding can be found, allows Argonne National Laboratory to also buy yet another exascale machine.
Oak Ridge, Argonne, and Livermore …
Bidders Off And Running After $1.8 Billion DOE Exascale Super Deals was written by Timothy Prickett Morgan at The Next Platform.
The cloud-native software company said it will price 37 million Class A shares between $14 and $16 per share.
