Some notes on why crypto backdoors are unreasonable
Today, a congressional committee held hearings about 'crypto backdoors' that would allow the FBI to decrypt text messages, phone calls, and data on phones. The thing to note about this topic is that it's not anywhere close to reasonable public policy. The technical and international problems are unsolvable with anything close to the proposed policy. Even if the policy were reasonable, it's unreasonable that law enforcement should be lobbying for it.Crypto is end-to-end
The debate hinges on a huge fallacy, that it's about regulating industry, forcing companies like Apple to include backdoors. This makes it seem like it's a small law. The truth is that crypto is end-to-end. Apple sells a generic computer we hold in our hand. As a user, I can install any software I want on it -- including software that completely defeats any backdoor that Apple would install. Examples of such software would be Signal and Silent Circle.
It seems reasonable that you could extend the law so that it covers any software provider. But that doesn't work, because software is often open-source, meaning that anybody can build their own app from it. Starting from scratch, it would take me about six-months to write my Continue reading