Network operators increasingly rely on generic hosts, rather than specialized routers (appliances) to forward traffic. Much of the performance on hosts relies on offloading packets switching and processing to specialized hardware on the network interface card. In this episode of the Hedge, Krzysztof Wróbel and Maciej Rabęda join Russ and Tom to talk about hardware offloading.
You can find out more about hardware offloading here.
Today, we are thrilled to announce new Cloudflare Zero Trust dashboards on Elastic. Shared customers using Elastic can now use these pre-built dashboards to store, search, and analyze their Zero Trust logs.
When organizations look to adopt a Zero Trust architecture, there are many components to get right. If products are configured incorrectly, used maliciously, or security is somehow breached during the process, it can open your organization to underlying security risks without the ability to get insight from your data quickly and efficiently.
As a Cloudflare technology partner, Elastic helps Cloudflare customers find what they need faster, while keeping applications running smoothly and protecting against cyber threats. “I'm pleased to share our collaboration with Cloudflare, making it even easier to deploy log and analytics dashboards. This partnership combines Elastic's open approach with Cloudflare's practical solutions, offering straightforward tools for enterprise search, observability, and security deployment,” explained Mark Dodds, Chief Revenue Officer at Elastic.
With this joint solution, we’ve made it easy for customers to seamlessly forward their Zero Trust logs to Elastic via Logpush jobs. This can be achieved directly via a Restful API or through an intermediary storage solution like Continue reading
In a previous BGP lab exercise, I described how an Internet Service Provider could run BGP with a customer without the customer having a public BGP AS number. The only drawback of that approach: the private BGP AS number gets into the AS path, and everyone else on the Internet starts giving you dirty looks (or drops your prefixes).
Let’s fix that. Most BGP implementations have some remove private AS functionality that scrubs AS paths during outgoing update processing. You can practice it in the Remove Private BGP AS Numbers from the AS Path lab exercise.
In a previous BGP lab exercise, I described how an Internet Service Provider could run BGP with a customer without the customer having a public BGP AS number. The only drawback of that approach: the private BGP AS number gets into the AS path, and everyone else on the Internet starts giving you dirty looks (or drops your prefixes).
Let’s fix that. Most BGP implementations have some remove private AS functionality that scrubs AS paths during outgoing update processing. You can practice it in the Remove Private BGP AS Numbers from the AS Path lab exercise.
Kurt Wauters sent me an interesting challenge: how do we do rollbacks based on customer requests? Here’s a typical scenario:
You might have deployed a change that works perfectly fine from a network perspective but broke a customer application (for example, due to undocumented usage), so you must be able to return to the previous state even if everything works. Everybody says you need to “roll forward” (improve your change so it works), but you don’t always have that luxury and might need to take a step back. So, change tracking is essential.
He’s right: the undo functionality we take for granted in consumer software (for example, Microsoft Word) has totally spoiled us.
Kurt Wauters sent me an interesting challenge: how do we do rollbacks based on customer requests? Here’s a typical scenario:
You might have deployed a change that works perfectly fine from a network perspective but broke a customer application (for example, due to undocumented usage), so you must be able to return to the previous state even if everything works. Everybody says you need to “roll forward” (improve your change so it works), but you don’t always have that luxury and might need to take a step back. So, change tracking is essential.
He’s right: the undo functionality we take for granted in consumer software (for example, Microsoft Word) has totally spoiled us.
There are many articles on BFD. It is well known that BFD has the following advantages over routing protocol hellos/keepalives:
What does light weight mean, though? Does it mean that the packets are smaller? Let’s compare a BFD packet to an OSPF Hello. Starting with the OSPF Hello:
Frame 269: 114 bytes on wire (912 bits), 114 bytes captured (912 bits) on interface ens192, id 1 Ethernet II, Src: 00:50:56:ad:8d:3c, Dst: 01:00:5e:00:00:05 Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 203.0.113.0, Dst: 224.0.0.5 Open Shortest Path First OSPF Header Version: 2 Message Type: Hello Packet (1) Packet Length: 48 Source OSPF Router: 192.168.128.223 Area ID: 0.0.0.0 (Backbone) Checksum: 0x7193 [correct] Auth Type: Null (0) Auth Data (none): 0000000000000000 OSPF Hello Packet OSPF LLS Data Block
There’s 114 bytes on the wire consisting of:
I got this question after publishing the BGP Session Templates lab exercise:
Would you apply BGP route maps with a peer/policy template or directly to a BGP neighbor? Of course, it depends; however, I believe in using a template for neighbors with the same general parameters and being more specific per neighbor when it comes to route manipulation.
As my reader already pointed out, the correct answer is It Depends, now let’s dig into the details ;)
I got this question after publishing the BGP Session Templates lab exercise:
Would you apply BGP route maps with a peer/policy template or directly to a BGP neighbor? Of course, it depends; however, I believe in using a template for neighbors with the same general parameters and being more specific per neighbor when it comes to route manipulation.
As my reader already pointed out, the correct answer is It Depends, now let’s dig into the details ;)
https://codingpackets.com/blog/manage-vyos-devices-with-saltstack
The fun question about network layer addresses is: are we addressing nodes or individual node interfaces? On the data link layer, we never had this issue because it was obvious that a data link layer endpoint is an interface, so each interface should have a unique data link layer address.
Interestingly, that’s not the case on transparent bridges. Even though they have multiple interfaces, the whole bridge has a single MAC address, so one could claim we’re addressing nodes connected to a single data link layer. The IEEE standard is unambiguous: in every relevant diagram, the MAC address sits on top of multiple interfaces because the MAC address belongs to the control plane.
The fun question about network layer addresses is: are we addressing nodes or individual node interfaces? On the data link layer, we never had this issue because it was obvious that a data link layer endpoint is an interface, so each interface should have a unique data link layer address.
Interestingly, that’s not the case on transparent bridges. Even though they have multiple interfaces, the whole bridge has a single MAC address, so one could claim we’re addressing nodes connected to a single data link layer. The IEEE standard is unambiguous: in every relevant diagram, the MAC address sits on top of multiple interfaces because the MAC address belongs to the control plane.