Total cloud revenues grew 44 percent to $1.5 billion.
One story that seems to have flown under the radar this week with the Net Neutrality discussion being so dominant was the little hiccup with BGP on Wednesday. According to sources, sources inside AS39523 were able to redirect traffic from some major sites like Facebook, Google, and Microsoft through their network. Since the ISP in question is located inside Russia, there’s been quite a lot of conversation about the purpose of this misconfiguration. Is it simply an accident? Or is it a nefarious plot? Regardless of the intent, the fact that we live in 2017 and can cause massive portions of Internet traffic to be rerouted has many people worried.
BGP is the foundation of the modern Internet. It’s how routes are exchanged between every autonomous system (AS) and how traffic destined for your favorite cloud service or cat picture hosting provider gets to where it’s supposed to be going. BGP is the glue that makes the Internet work.
But BGP, for all of the greatness that it provides, is still very fallible. It’s prone to misconfiguration. Look no further than the Level 3 outage last month. Or the outage that Google caused in Japan in August. Continue reading
For those of us that often have to use console servers to connect over IP to serial ports of devices, the removal of telnet from High Sierra is a bit of a pain in the bum. Here are two things you can do:
Use the ‘nc’ command to connect in exactly the same way as you used to do at the command-line with telnet. For example: nc <IP address> <Port Number>
SFTP is good and I use it wherever I can, but sometimes you come across some old kit that can’t support SSH or SFTP, so you just need those old tools. An alternative is to do this:
From cyberattacks on election infrastructure, to attempted hacking of voting machines, to attacks on campaign websites, the last few years have brought us unprecedented attempts to use online vulnerabilities to affect elections both in the United States and abroad. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security reported that individuals tried to hack voter registration files or public election sites in 21 states prior to the 2016 elections. In Europe, hackers targeted not only the campaign of Emmanuel Macron in France, but government election infrastructure in the Czech Republic and Montenegro.
Cyber attack is only one of the many online challenges facing election officials. Unpredictable website traffic patterns are another. Voter registration websites see a flood of legitimate traffic as registration deadlines approach. Election websites must integrate reported results and stay online notwithstanding notoriously hard-to-model election day loads.
We at Cloudflare have seen many election-related cyber challenges firsthand. In the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Cloudflare protected most of the major presidential campaign websites from cyberattack, including the Trump/Pence campaign website, the website for the campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders, and websites for 14 of the 15 leading candidates from the two major parties. We have also protected election Continue reading
From cyberattacks on election infrastructure, to attempted hacking of voting machines, to attacks on campaign websites, the last few years have brought us unprecedented attempts to use online vulnerabilities to affect elections both in the United States and abroad. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security reported that individuals tried to hack voter registration files or public election sites in 21 states prior to the 2016 elections. In Europe, hackers targeted not only the campaign of Emmanuel Macron in France, but government election infrastructure in the Czech Republic and Montenegro.
Cyber attack is only one of the many online challenges facing election officials. Unpredictable website traffic patterns are another. Voter registration websites see a flood of legitimate traffic as registration deadlines approach. Election websites must integrate reported results and stay online notwithstanding notoriously hard-to-model election day loads.
We at Cloudflare have seen many election-related cyber challenges firsthand. In the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Cloudflare protected most of the major presidential campaign websites from cyberattack, including the Trump/Pence campaign website, the website for the campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders, and websites for 14 of the 15 leading candidates from the two major parties. We have also protected election Continue reading
There don’t seem to be many operational commands in Junos to tell you what’s going on with regard to Storm Control. Here’s all I could find – let me know if you know of more:
In the lab, I configured this storm control profile:
{master:1} user@VCF> show configuration forwarding-options storm-control-profiles TAT-StormControl { all { bandwidth-level 1000; } action-shutdown; }
This was then configured on ae2, which is a trunk interface towards the Ixia tester:
{master:1} user@VCF> show configuration interfaces ae2 unit 0 family ethernet-switching { interface-mode trunk; storm-control TAT-StormControl; }
Unfortunately there’s no ‘show forwarding-options storm-control’ type command to see what interfaces have storm control configured. I can’t find any other command that shows this info either.
So I generate 3Mbps of traffic to ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff from my Ixia into the VCF and the port goes disabled immediately according to the logs:
Dec 15 12:57:23 VCF l2ald[3261]: L2ALD_ST_CTL_IN_EFFECT: ae2.0: storm control in effect on the port Dec 15 12:57:23 VCF l2ald[3261]: L2ALD_ST_CTL_DISABLED: ae2.0: storm control disabled port Dec 15 12:57:23 VCF l2cpd[1814]: Root bridge in routing-instance 'default' changed from 4096:b0:a8:6e:0a:bd:41 to 32768:dc:38:e1:5f:c4:02 Dec 15 12:57:23 VCF mib2d[3271]: SNMP_TRAP_LINK_DOWN: ifIndex 526, ifAdminStatus up(1), ifOperStatus down(2), ifName ae2
Speed in networks is actually difficult to measure.
I haven’t done an update on what Avaya was doing in the data center space for years, so I asked my good friend Roger Lapuh to do a short presentation on:
The videos are now available to everyone with a valid ipSpace.net account – the easiest way to get it is a trial subscription.
In this post I’ll demonstrate how to build a simple OpenStack lab with OpenDaylight-managed virtual networking and integrate it with a Cisco IOS-XE data centre gateway using EVPN.
Continue readingFor the last 5 years OpenStack has been the training ground for a lot of emerging DC SDN solutions. OpenStack integration use case was one of the most compelling and easiest to implement thanks to the limited and suboptimal implementation of the native networking stack. Today, in 2017, features like L2 population, local ARP responder, L2 gateway integration, distributed routing and service function chaining have all become available in vanilla OpenStack and don’t require a proprietary SDN controller anymore. Admittedly, some of the features are still not (and may never be) implemented in the most optimal way (e.g. DVR). This is where new opensource SDN controllers, the likes of OVN and Dragonflow, step in to provide scalable, elegant and efficient implementation of these advanced networking features. However one major feature still remains outside of the scope of a lot of these new opensource SDN projects, and that is data centre gateway (DC-GW) integration. Let me start by explain why you would need this feature in the first place.
OpenStack Neutron and VMware NSX, both being pure software solutions, rely on a special type of node to forward traffic between VMs Continue reading
The blog post contains notes about the installation of piCore Linux on Raspberry Pi 3 computer. The related topic is well known, discussed by many similar posts however the article represents my own copy & paste reference for later usage.
The first generation of Raspberry Pi 1 has been with us since February 2012. Recently in version 3B, the Pi3 is equipped with 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 processor, 1 GB of RAM and it has integrated 2.4 GHz WiFi 802.11n (150 Mbit/s), Bluetooth 4.1 (24 Mbit/s) on Broadcom BCM43438 chip. It also provides the integrated 10/100 Ethernet port. These factors along with the cheap price (~ 35 US), small size (~ 85.60mm x 56mm x 21mm), low weight (~ 45g) and low power consumption (maximum 1.34 A or 6.7 W under stress when peripherals and WiFi are connected) makes this single-board computer ideal candidate for use in the recent Internet of Things (IoT) world.
Raspberry Pi can run several OSs built for ARM architecture such as Windows 10 IoT Core, Raspbian (based on Debian), Ubuntu Mate and many others. The Linux distributions offer either full desktop environment or they are released Continue reading
When we talk about women and technology, we need to talk data. In the United States, a recent report by the National Center for Women and Information Technology highlighted that only 26% of the workforce in the computer field is made up of women. In addition, a survey by Silicon Valley Bank revealed that 68% of startups do not have women on their board. In India, women make up just 30% of the workforce in the technology industry. In many European countries, the wage gap between men and women is present in technological positions. In Latin America, the proportion of women studying in computer careers is low. In addition, shortcomings in Internet access makes it difficult for women of all ages to use the technology in Africa.
Increasing access, skills, and leadership of women and girls in ICT has enormous potential for improving their health and emancipating them through access to information, education and trade opportunities, strengthening not only families and communities, but also national economies and global society as a whole.
In order to speak on a daily basis and to make the problem visible, we considered it necessary to create a Special Interest Group to help change those statistics Continue reading
This is a guest post by Elie Bursztein who writes about security and anti-abuse research. It was first published on his blog and has been lightly edited.
This post provides a retrospective analysis of Mirai — the infamous Internet-of-Things botnet that took down major websites via massive distributed denial-of-service using hundreds of thousands of compromised Internet-Of-Things devices. This research was conducted by a team of researchers from Cloudflare, Georgia Tech, Google, Akamai, the University of Illinois, the University of Michigan, and Merit Network and resulted in a paper published at USENIX Security 2017.
At its peak in September 2016, Mirai temporarily crippled several high-profile services such as OVH, Dyn, and Krebs on Security via massive distributed Denial of service attacks (DDoS). OVH reported that these attacks exceeded 1 Tbps—the largest on public record.
What’s remarkable about these record-breaking attacks is they were carried out via small, innocuous Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices like home routers, air-quality monitors, and personal surveillance cameras. At its peak, Mirai infected over 600,000 vulnerable IoT devices, according to our measurements.
This blog post follows the timeline above
This is a guest post by Elie Bursztein who writes about security and anti-abuse research. It was first published on his blog and has been lightly edited.
This post provides a retrospective analysis of Mirai — the infamous Internet-of-Things botnet that took down major websites via massive distributed denial-of-service using hundreds of thousands of compromised Internet-Of-Things devices. This research was conducted by a team of researchers from Cloudflare (Jaime Cochran, Nick Sullivan), Georgia Tech, Google, Akamai, the University of Illinois, the University of Michigan, and Merit Network and resulted in a paper published at USENIX Security 2017.
At its peak in September 2016, Mirai temporarily crippled several high-profile services such as OVH, Dyn, and Krebs on Security via massive distributed Denial of service attacks (DDoS). OVH reported that these attacks exceeded 1 Tbps—the largest on public record.
What’s remarkable about these record-breaking attacks is they were carried out via small, innocuous Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices like home routers, air-quality monitors, and personal surveillance cameras. At its peak, Mirai infected over 600,000 vulnerable IoT devices, according to our measurements.
This blog post follows the timeline above