In episode 15, Pete Welcher and Chris Kane join us to talk about what exactly characterizes a well run network. Is it great documentation? Is it consistent application of best practices? Maybe it’s process and procedure? Join our guests, and the decades of experience they bring, as they sit around the virtual roundtable to share their thoughts on the topic.
Show Notes
Design
Operations
In episode 15, Pete Welcher and Chris Kane join us to talk about what exactly characterizes a well run network. Is it great documentation? Is it consistent application of best practices? Maybe it’s process and procedure? Join our guests, and the decades of experience they bring, as they sit around the virtual roundtable to share their thoughts on the topic.
Show Notes
Design
Operations
It doesn't makes IT totally fun, "but at least mildly interesting."
RIPE 75 was held on 22-26 October 2017 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and was the second time the meeting has come to the Middle East. 483 participants from 54 countries including 175 newcomers came together to discuss operational issues and share expertise about the Internet, with a particular focus on the RIPE region that covers Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.
Jan Žorž and Kevin Meynell from the Deploy360 team, along with Salam Yamout from the Middle East Bureau were also actively involved in the launch of a new Internet-of-Things Working Group, hosting a Routing Security BoF, and raising awareness of IRTF work on Human Rights Protocol Considerations.
The BoF session on ‘Internet Routing Health’ was organised by the Internet Society, and chaired by Jan and Benno Overreinder (NLnet Labs). The BoF attracted 20 participants variously drawn from commercial network operators and cloud providers, Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and academia, with the aim of discussing ideas for measuring the health of the Internet routing system in order to obtain empirical data to strengthen the case for collaborative routing security.
The IoT session aimed to build on the RIPE IoT Roundtable meeting that was held on 21 September 2017 in Leeds, UK, and Continue reading
The move targets service providers looking for "cloudification" of their network resources.
Interop ITX infrastructure track chair Keith Townsend talks about working his way up from the help desk.
Interop ITX infrastructure track chair Keith Townsend talks about working his way up from the help desk.
Researchers recently discovered a dangerous vulnerability – called ROCA – in cryptographic smartcards, security tokens, and other secure hardware chips manufactured by Infineon Technologies. These articles on Ars Technica and The Register give a good background.
Yes. It’s serious in practice and in principle. Infineon used a flawed key generation routine, which means those keys are easier to crack, and the routine is used in chips embedded in a wide variety of devices. It’s reckoned that the flawed routine has been in use since 2012 and has probably been used to generate tens of millions of keys. Naturally, many of those keys will have been generated precisely because someone had data or resources that they particularly wanted to secure.
It’s serious because a flawed implementation managed to get through all the development and standardisation processes without being spotted, and has been widely deployed on mass-market devices.
The flaw affects keys generated for the RSA and OpenPGP algorithms, both of which are public key crypto systems. Public key cryptography is based on pairs of keys, one of which is made public and the other kept private:
This is the third from the series of the articles that discuss configuration of the entire enterprise network. The article focuses on the configuration of the distribution and core switches. The distribution layer consists of two multilayer switches vEOS-DIS-I and vEOS-DIS-II. The switches are Arista vEOS version 4.17.2F Qemu appliances installed on VMware disks. Each appliance has assigned 1536 MB RAM.
The distribution switches route traffic between end user VLANs and they connect the lower layer network to a Core layer. The layer 3 (routed) interfaces connect both distribution switches to each other and to the Core switches. The interfaces toward the Access layer are layer 2 (switchports). The OSPF routing protocol is running on the distribution switches so there is only l3 connectivity between distribution and core layer.
Picture 1 - Distribution and Core Layers of Enterprise Campus Network
Note: The configuration files of the distribution switches are: vEOS-DIS-I and vEOS-DIS-II.
The core layer consists of the switches vIOS-Core-I and vIOS-Core-II. These are the Cisco vIOS-l2 Qemu appliances on qcow2 disks, version 15.2. Each switch has assigned 768 MB RAM by GNS3. The core layer is completely layer3. It si connected to the lower Continue reading
Here’s a catalog of all the media I produced (or helped produce) in October 2017. I’ve decided to add some content summaries so that you have good incentive to give some of the podcasts a listen if they tickle your fancy.