AppDefense integrates with several technology partners including IBM Security, RSA, Carbon Black, SecureWorks, and Puppet.
The systems integrate Dell EMC hardware and VMware software.
Accenture, Sysco, Adidas, Medtronic, and Moody’s are early-access customers.
Last Friday, 25 August, a routing incident caused large-scale internet disruption. It hit Japanese users the hardest, slowing or blocking access to websites and online services for dozens of Japanese companies.
What happened is that Google accidentally leaked BGP prefixes it learned from peering relationships, essentially becoming a transit provider instead of simply exchanging traffic between two networks and their customers. This also exposed some internal traffic engineering that caused many of these prefixes to get de-aggregated and therefore raised their probability of getting accepted elsewhere.
Initial public cloud support is limited to AWS and Azure environments.
Conversely, Google will take advantage of Marketo's Engagement Platform.
VeloCloud's latest members include Symantec, VMware, and Forcepoint.
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At 03:22 UTC on Friday, 25 August 2017, the internet experienced the effects of another massive BGP routing leak. This time it was Google who leaked over 160,000 prefixes to Verizon, who in turn accepted these routes and passed them on. Despite the fact that the leak took place in Chicago, Illinois, it had devastating consequences for the internet in Japan, half a world away. Two of Japan’s major telecoms (KDDI and NTT’s OCN) were severely affected, posting outage notices (KDDI / OCN pictured below).
Massive routing leaks continue
In recent years, large-scale (100K+ prefix) BGP routing leaks typically fall into one of two buckets: the leaker either 1) announces the global routing table as if it is the origin (or source) of all the routes (see Indosat in 2014), or 2) takes the global routing table as learned from providers and/or peers and mistakenly announced it to another provider (see Telekom Malaysia in 2015).
This case is different because the vast majority of the routes involved in this massive routing leak were not in the global routing table at the time but instead were more-specifics of routes that were. This is an important Continue reading
On August 17th, 2017, multiple Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and content providers were subject to significant attacks from a botnet dubbed WireX. The botnet is named for an anagram for one of the delimiter strings in its command and control protocol. The WireX botnet comprises primarily Android devices running malicious applications and is designed to create DDoS traffic. The botnet is sometimes associated with ransom notes to targets.
A few days ago, Google was alerted that this malware was available on its Play Store. Shortly following the notification, Google removed hundreds of affected applications and started the process to remove the applications from all devices.
Researchers from Akamai, Cloudflare, Flashpoint, Google, Oracle Dyn, RiskIQ, Team Cymru, and other organizations cooperated to combat this botnet. Evidence indicates that the botnet may have been active as early as August 2nd, but it was the attacks on August 17th that drew the attention of these organizations. This post represents the combined knowledge and efforts of the researchers working to share information about a botnet in the best interest of the internet community as a whole. This blog post was written together by researchers from numerous organizations and released Continue reading