Some notes on eFail
I've been busy trying to replicate the "eFail" PGP/SMIME bug. I thought I'd write up some notes.PGP and S/MIME encrypt emails, so that eavesdroppers can't read them. The bugs potentially allow eavesdroppers to take the encrypted emails they've captured and resend them to you, reformatted in a way that allows them to decrypt the messages.
Disable remote/external content in email
The most important defense is to disable "external" or "remote" content from being automatically loaded. This is when HTML-formatted emails attempt to load images from remote websites. This happens legitimately when they want to display images, but not fill up the email with them. But most of the time this is illegitimate, they hide images on the webpage in order to track you with unique IDs and cookies. For example, this is the code at the end of an email from politician Bernie Sanders to his supporters. Notice the long random number assigned to track me, and the width/height of this image is set to one pixel, so you don't even see it:Such trackers are so pernicious they are disabled by default in most email clients. This is an example of the settings in Thunderbird:
The problem is Continue reading








The mysterious probe isn’t related to a breach or any security concern about its products.
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