Trend data on the SolarWinds Orion compromise


On Sunday, December 13, FireEye released a report on a sophisticated supply chain attack leveraging SolarWinds' Orion IT monitoring software. The malware was distributed as part of regular updates to Orion and had a valid digital signature.
One of the notable features of the malware is the way it hides its network traffic using a multi-staged approach. First, the malware determines its command and control (C2) server using a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to construct and resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud[.]com.
These algorithmically generated strings are added as a subdomain of one of the following domain names to create a new fully-qualified domain name to resolve:
.appsync-api[.]eu-west-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com
.appsync-api[.]us-west-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com
.appsync-api[.]us-east-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com
.appsync-api[.]us-east-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com
An example of such a domain name might look like: hig4gcdkgjkrt24v6isue7ax09nksd[.]appsync-api[.]eu-west-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com
The DNS query response to a subdomain of one of the above will return a CNAME record that points to another C2 domain, which is used for data exfiltration. The following subdomains were identified as the C2 domains used for data exfiltration:
freescanonline[.]com
deftsecurity[.]com
thedoccloud[.]com
websitetheme[.]com
highdatabase[.]com
incomeupdate[.]com
databasegalore[.]com
panhardware[.]com
zupertech[.]com
virtualdataserver[.]com
Continue reading
We’ve all done it once The old buggers say Powered down the data centre by accident one day Today its a lot harder to do because people like me have all done it once Now no one does it just once And no one remembers Why the power system Is done that way
