The concern about securing the clusters has grown exponentially and one of the ways to secure it is by isolating the cluster from the Internet to lower the risk of eventual attack. Enterprises that deal with confidential customer data and work with regulatory agencies, such as financial and insurance institutions, require air gap environments for their clusters to create highly secure environments.
The air gap is a security configuration in which the cluster, network, or workload will not have access to the Internet, unless it is explicitly authorized to do so. It is a highly controlled environment and prevents the cluster from establishing external connections without prior authorizations.
The diagram below shows an air gap network:

In a containerized environment, the cluster needs to pull the images for spinning up containers and it is usually done by pulling the images from a repository located on the cloud or Internet. However, as the air gap network doesn’t have access to the Internet, pulling images from the Internet is not possible. To address this situation, it is necessary to create a private registry/repository in the air gap network and pull all required images for the cluster into Continue reading
Host Keith Parsons speaks with Peter MacKenzie, a trainer and course developer in the wireless industry, about the importance of vendor-neutral training.
The post Heavy Wireless 004: Vendor Agnostic Training with Peter MacKenzie appeared first on Packet Pushers.
In Chapter Five, we deployed an internal load balancer (ILB) in the vnet-hub. It was attached to the subnet 10.0.0.0/24, where it obtained the frontend IP (FIP) 10.0.1.6. Next, we created a backend pool and associated our NVAs with it. Finally, we bound the frontend IP 10.0.1.6 to the backend pool to complete the ILB setup.
Next, in vnet-spoke1, we created a route table called rt-spoke1. This route table contained a user-defined route (UDR) for 10.2.0.0/24 (vnet-spoke2) with the next-hop set as 10.0.1.6. We attached this route table to the subnet 10.1.0.0/24. Similarly, in vnet-spoke2, we implemented a user-defined route for 10.1.0.0/24 (vnet-spoke1). By configuring these UDRs, we ensured that the spoke-to-spoke traffic would pass through the ILB and one of the NVAs on vnet-hub. Note that in this design, the Virtual Network Gateway is not required for spoke-to-spoke traffic.
In this chapter, we will add a Virtual Network Gateway (VGW) into the topology and establish an IPsec VPN connection between the on-premises network edge router and VGW. Additionally, we will deploy a new route table called "rt-gw-snet" where we add routing entries to the spoke VNets with the next-hop IP address 10.0.1.6 (ILB's frontend IP). Besides, we will add a routing entry 10.3.0.0/16 > 10.0.1.6 into the existing route tables on vnet-spoke-1 and vnet-spoke-2 (not shown in figure 6-1). This configuration will ensure that the spoke to spoke and spoke to on-prem flows are directed through one of the Network Virtual Appliances (NVAs) via ILB. The NVAs use the default route table, where the VGW propagates all the routes learned from VPN peers. However, we do not propagate routes from the default route table into the "rt-gw-snet" and "rt-prod-1" route tables. To enable the spoke VNets to use the VGW on the hub VNet, we allow it in VNet peering configurations.


Over the last several years, governments in a number of countries in the Middle East/Northern Africa (MENA) region have taken to implementing widespread nationwide shutdowns in an effort to prevent cheating on nationwide academic exams. Although it is unclear whether such shutdowns are actually successful in curbing cheating, it is clear that they take a financial toll on the impacted countries, with estimated losses in the millions of US dollars.
During the first two weeks of June 2023, we’ve seen Iraq implementing a series of multi-hour shutdowns that will reportedly occur through mid-July, as well as Algeria taking similar actions to prevent cheating on baccalaureate exams. Shutdowns in Syria were reported to begin on June 7, but there’s been no indication of them in traffic data as of this writing (June 13). These actions echo those taken in Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria in 2022 and in Syria and Sudan in 2021.
(Note: The interactive graphs below have been embedded directly into the blog post using a new Cloudflare Radar feature. This post is best viewed in landscape mode when on a mobile device.)
Iraq had reportedly committed on May 15 to not implementing Internet shutdowns during the Continue reading
While preparing the Internet Routing Security webinar, I stumbled upon RFC 7908, containing an excellent taxonomy of BGP route leaks. I never checked whether it covers every possible scenario1, but I found it a handy resource when organizing my thoughts.
Let’s walk through the various leak types the authors identified using the following sample topology:
While preparing the Internet Routing Security webinar, I stumbled upon RFC 7908, containing an excellent taxonomy of BGP route leaks. I never checked whether it covers every possible scenario1, but I found it a handy resource when organizing my thoughts.
Let’s walk through the various leak types the authors identified using the following sample topology:
Uncollected outbursts and Mind Farts on Vision Pro


Starting today, Cloudflare’s API Gateway can protect GraphQL APIs against malicious requests that may cause a denial of service to the origin. In particular, API Gateway will now protect against two of the most common GraphQL abuse vectors: deeply nested queries and queries that request more information than they should.
Typical RESTful HTTP APIs contain tens or hundreds of endpoints. GraphQL APIs differ by typically only providing a single endpoint for clients to communicate with and offering highly flexible queries that can return variable amounts of data. While GraphQL’s power and usefulness rests on the flexibility to query an API about only the specific data you need, that same flexibility adds an increased risk of abuse. Abusive requests to a single GraphQL API can place disproportional load on the origin, abuse the N+1 problem, or exploit a recursive relationship between data dimensions. In order to add GraphQL security features to API Gateway, we needed to obtain visibility inside the requests so that we could apply different security settings based on request parameters. To achieve that visibility, we built our own GraphQL query parser. Read on to learn about how we built the parser and the security features it enabled.
Take a Network Break: Drew is on holiday (again) and Ethan shows up. Who knew he was still around ? We start with FU, Cisco Live was underwhelming announcing a new focus simplicity and that customers hate their licensing, Bluecat spends again, Hashicorp gets a financial slapping, Itential ships a new version and Quantum Space Networking.
The post Network Break 434: Cisco Licensing To Get Simpler, Bluecat Buys Again, Hashicorp Money Problems, and Itential Pops A Release appeared first on Packet Pushers.
Stefano Sasso added two new Junos platforms in netlab release 1.5.4:
There are also the usual bug fixes, and we moved the documentation to netlab.tools.
Stefano Sasso added two new Junos platforms in netlab release 1.5.4:
There are also the usual bug fixes, and we moved the documentation to netlab.tools.